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ABSTRACT 
What do individual motives and organizational factors have to do with individuals 
from public charities joining and participating in child-focused advocacy coalitions? A 
mail survey of members of child-focused advocacy coalitions in California was 
conducted in order to investigate the correlation between incentives for joining advocacy 
coalitions and level of advocacy activity. The study also examined the relationships 
among incentives and level of advocacy activity and other factors, including role in the 
coalition, job function, official duty, and organizational size. Four hundred surveys were 
mailed, yielding a final valid response rate of 36.8%. 
The study found that strategic incentives, such as bringing about social change to 
benefit others and expressing important personal values, were the most influential 
incentives behind members' decisions to join advocacy coalitions, particularly for core 
members, whereas resource development incentives, such as protesting cuts or generating 
revenue, were the weakest influences on decisions to join. The results showed that 
strategic incentives had the highest positive correlation with action, followed by 
fellowship incentives, such as networking with colleagues, and then resource 
development incentives. The study also found strong positive correlations among 
incentives to join and incentives to remain, along with a significant increase over time in 
resource development incentives. Finally, coalition members without advocacy in their 
job description were significantly more motivated to remain with advocacy coalitions by 
fellowship incentives than subjects with advocacy in their job description. It is 
recommended that coalition leaders direct their attention towards assessing and nurturing 
strategic and fellowship incentives within the coalitions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Children need a voice in our political system. We, adults, parents, caregivers, 
healthcare providers, teachers, who care about them have to ensure there are 
programs and services to take care of them and that the government 
continues/begins to consider their best interests in planning and spending. 
(Subject 304) 
As of2002, approximately 72.8 million children under age 18 were living in the 
United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003). Considering the great number of children in 
America, we need to muster significant resources to ensure that they remain safe and 
healthy, succeed in school, and contribute to the development and vitality of their 
communities. Because children are undoubtedly underrepresented in the democratic 
process, advocacy on behalf of children is urgently needed to meet the critical needs of 
one of our nation's most dependent and vulnerable populations. Among the important 
resources available to conduct advocacy on behalf of children are the service providers 
that children encounter every day in public charities. All across America, health, 
education, housing, family, and employment professionals, among others, dedicate 
countless hours of service to children. 
But many professionals from across the spectrum of service provision create an 
even larger role for themselves. In addition to their responsibilities at their respective 
public charities, they also engage in advocacy. As the National Association of Social 
Workers' Code of Ethics, Section 6.04(a), states, "social workers should be aware ofthe 
impact of the political arena on practice and should advocate for changes in policy and 
legislation in order to meet basic human needs and promote social justice" (quoted in 
Schneider and Lester, 2001, p. 74). Service providers from the nonprofit sector have a 
long history of embracing the dual roles of charity and advocacy (Schneider and Lester, 
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2001). For example, in the late nineteenth century, Hull House Settlement workers led by 
Jane Addams (1938) successfully lobbied the Illinois legislature to enact protections for 
child workers. Today's charity workers continue this rich tradition of advocacy. On 
behalf of children, they strive to influence public policies through a variety of advocacy 
activities such as lobbying, media outreach, and constituent mobilization. Their deep 
understanding of children's issues adds valuable knowledge to advocacy efforts. As 
Berry (2001, p. 5) noted, "for congressional staffers and agency policymakers, expertise 
is the coin of the realm, and those who want to lobby them need to use the same 
currency." Moreover, Roberts-DeGennaro (1986a, p. 308) reported that "studies have 
suggested that the most important variable in the legislative and budgetary priorities 
given to social welfare programs is the presence of a community organization that can 
lobby successfully for these programs." Fortunately, these important advocates do not 
stand alone in their efforts; they unite through coalitions. 
Coalitions are groups of individuals and organizations working together on issues 
of common interest (McKay, 2001 ). Coalitions are not ends in themselves; they are 
"strategic devices to enhance the leverage of various organizations" (Roberts-DeGennaro, 
1986a, p. 309). Coalitions serve as a driving force to help communicate common goals 
and promote collective action. In fact, studies have shown that coalitions are a necessary 
and effective vehicle for advocacy on behalf of children (Kinley, 1986; Surgalla, 1984). 
In response to social conditions, such as the concentration of poverty in inner-city areas, 
"a wide-array of local partnerships that aim to mobilize significant action on behalf of 
young people converge on certain core values, assumptions, and operating principles ... 
to change an array of existing beliefs, work habits, resource priorities, and 
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institutionalized relationships" (Briggs, 2001, p. 6). For example, in California, the Kern 
County Network for Children brings together service agencies, residents, and local 
businesses to identify children's needs, find resources, and engage policymakers (Action 
Alliance for Children, 2002). Kern County Network for Children's efforts have improved 
children's lives: both infant death rates and high school drop-out rates have declined, 
while other indicators, such as immunization rates and school attendance, have improved. 
America is a nation of joiners, individuals "who for whatever reason choose to 
'combine in order to act'" (Schlesinger, 1949, p. 25). But why do individuals choose to 
join child-focused advocacy coalitions? Some join to express important personal values. 
Others join to provide altruistic service or social change for the benefit of others. Still 
others might join to associate with like-minded individuals or to network with colleagues. 
Finally, some join to foster or maintain the financial health of their organizations, such as 
by protesting cuts or generating revenue. Overall, there is a great deal of variability in 
motives that drive people and groups. Equally importantly, variability in motives is 
related to differences in behavior; some reasons for joining advocacy coalitions are 
stronger motivators than others. Yet the success of advocacy coalitions is fundamentally 
dependent upon the behavior of their members. Coalition members must heed the call to 
action, that is, must act upon messages that urge advocacy, such as writing Congress in 
support of a piece of legislation. Without action, coalitions like the Kern County Network 
for Children could not engage policymakers on behalf of children. But if different 
motives are tied to different behaviors, how does this impact heeding the call to action? 
Are some incentives - for instance, financial rewards - more powerful motivators to 
advocacy than others, such as personal values? While a number of factors likely impact 
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coalition members' willingness and ability to heed the call to action, this study examined 
a key factor in all behavior: the motives behind it. Why do individuals from public 
charities join child-focused advocacy coalitions? Is there an association between 
particular reasons for joining advocacy coalitions and responsiveness to calls to action? 
How do organizational factors, such as staff size, budget size, job function, and official 
duties impact heeding the call? 
This study was important for several reasons. First of all, nonprofit organizations 
have historically performed a central role in America's civic engagement and democracy 
(O'Neill, 2002; Reid, 2000). The First Amendment established the foundations of 
advocacy: the freedom of speech and the rights to peaceably assemble and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances. In nineteenth-century America, factors such as 
ethnic and religious diversity, urbanization, humanitarian motivations, and economic and 
political changes, converged creating a deluge of new voluntary associations (O'Neill, 
2002). More than a century later, in the 1970s, nonprofit organizations had become even 
more pervasive in America, and the prominent Filer Commission conducted a thorough 
examination of the scope and roles of the nonprofit sector (Commission on Private 
Philanthropy and Public Needs, 1975). The commission affirmed the role of nonprofit 
organizations in shaping and advancing public policy. Equally importantly, the 
commission concluded that "the monitoring and influencing of government may be 
emerging as one of the single most important and effective functions of the private 
nonprofit sector" (p. 45). Certainly such broad validation warranted investigation into the 
current nature of nonprofit child-focused advocacy coalitions. 
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Next, troubling information on the health and well-being of children supported the 
need for this research as well. Childhood poverty remains a critical problem. Poverty has 
long-lasting negative effects on the safety, health, and education of children. Figures on 
child poverty should raise alarms. In 2000, 16.1% of children under age 18 lived below 
the poverty threshold (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001a). In California that year, the rate was 
19.2% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001b). Data on education add to the concerns; results from 
California's STAR standardized testing fueled worries about the prospects for many 
children. A troubling 39% of all 11th grade students rated below basic, or worse, on 
English/Language arts, while students receiving special education services attained a 
dismal3% proficiency score (California Department of Education, 2002). Even the 
environment itself endangers children. Nationally, 18.5% of children in 2001lived in 
areas that did not meet one or more of the Primary National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 2003, Table 
POP9 .A, p. 86). Yet large numbers of children did not have health insurance. In 
California in 2001, about 1.3 million children under age 18 lacked health insurance or 
experienced gaps in coverage (Children Now, 2003). Taken together, this information 
suggests that the status of children is linked to their underrepresentation in the democratic 
process. Children do not vote; their voices are easily ignored, if heard at all. Service 
providers acting through advocacy coalitions speak for children, guard their interests, and 
promote their health and well-being. There was a vital need to support these efforts 
through research. 
This study was also needed because there is a dearth of information about 
advocacy by nonprofit organizations (Krehely, 2001; McCarthy and Castelli, 2001; Reid, 
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2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001 ). De Vita, Mosher-Williams, and Stengel (200 1) 
reported that "very little information is available on the number, types, geographic 
distribution, or financial resources of nonprofit groups that direct their attention to 
children and child advocacy issues" (p. 4). This was particularly true for public interest 
coalitions (Hula, 1999). Additionally, while advocacy included a wide range of ideas and 
activities, few people agreed on what it actually meant (Ezell, 1994; McCarthy and 
Castelli, 2001; Reid, 2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001 ). Persistent definitional problems 
and a general dearth of information sounded a call for more research. 
Finally, strengthening the capacity of child-focused advocacy coalitions is key to 
building a stronger voice for children; this served as the ultimate rationale for the study. 
Too many calls to action are left unheeded, weakening the collective force of child-
focused advocacy coalitions. In order to get the most action from available resources, it is 
critical that nonprofit leaders understand the motivations of the human resources at their 
disposal. But sound human resource management cannot take place without relevant 
information on the current and potential human resources (Pynes, 1997). This study 
aimed to support leaders at advocacy coalitions by providing current information on the 
motivations and advocacy activities oftheir members. Managers, advocates, funders, and 
policymakers can all use these findings to support child advocacy. With such knowledge 
at hand, the ability of leaders to improve the rates of response by coalition members to 
calls to action would be enhanced, furthering public policy engagement and fostering 
safer, healthier, more successful lives for children. 
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CHAPTER ONE: REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND DELINIATION OF PROBLEM 
This chapter summarizes the principal theoretical and research literature relevant 
to the topic. Specifically, it covers key definitions, related literature, delineation of 
hypotheses and exploratory research questions, and the study's anticipated contributions 
to the field. 
Key Definitions 
Public Charities. For the purposes of this study, public charities were defined as 
nonprofit organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) ofthe Internal Revenue Code. 
Public charities include human and social service groups, hospitals and healthcare 
organizations, religious groups, arts organizations, educational institutions, advocacy 
groups, and others. 
Advocacy. Advocacy is not synonymous with lobbying. Advocacy encompasses a 
wide range of concepts and activities commonly linked to influencing the policymaking 
processes of government (Reid, 2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001 ), while lobbying 
typically refers to a narrower set of activities directed at legislators. In fact, with regards 
to public charities, the IRS limits its classification of advocacy to grassroots lobbying, 
meaning attempts to influence legislation by affecting public opinion, or direct lobbying, 
meaning attempts to influence legislation through communication with legislators or 
government officials participating in the formulation of legislation (Adler, 1999). 
Schneider and Lester (2001) described a number ofkey dimensions of advocacy, 
including speaking on behalf of another, taking action, promoting change, and securing 
social justice. Reid (2000) suggested yet another important dimension of advocacy: the 
notion of collective action. Groups of people unite and act around common causes. 
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Where action is concerned, a range of activities fall under the heading of advocacy, 
including public education, research, constituent mobilization, policy design, and 
lobbying, along with litigation, public demonstrations, and coalition building, among still 
others (McCarthy and Castelli, 2001; Reid, 2000). To all intents and purposes, no one 
really agrees on what advocacy actually means (Ezell, 1994; McCarthy and Castelli, 
2001; Reid, 2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001). To take only two examples, Jenkins 
( 1987, p. 297) broadly defined advocacy "as any attempt to influence the decisions of any 
institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest," while Polier ( 1977, p. 497) 
characterized child advocacy in particular "as an effort to challenge and change systems 
that are injurious to children, that are inadequate to prevent harm, or that provide 
inappropriate help to children" (p. 497). 
For the purposes of this study, advocacy was defined as an action that attempts to 
influence the proposed or actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities. 
There were a few key elements to this definition. Action meant actually doing something, 
moving beyond interest and intentions to effort. Furthermore, these actions were an 
attempt to exert influence, whether or not successful in outcome. Finally, the influence 
was aimed at the proposed or actual policies of government, which covered deliberations 
and decisions on, and implementation or practice of, these policies. 
Action Alert. Communication is the foundation of action. Through 
communications commonly known as action alerts, advocacy organizations call their 
members to action. Action alerts urge group members to conduct advocacy, typically 
around a particular issue. For example, the National Youth Advocacy Coalition (NYAC) 
has sent action alerts by email to its members that, on more than one occasion, 
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"contributed to the ability of youth and their advocates to have their voices heard" 
(Carey, 1996, p. 9). NY AC action alerts have encouraged "youth, teachers, parents, and 
service providers to send in written testimony" to Congress about antigay Congressional 
activities (p. 9). 
For the purposes of this study, an action alert was defined as a message urging 
group members to conduct advocacy. There were a few key elements to this definition. 
First, it did not restrict action alerts to any particular mode of delivery. Email, faxes, 
postal mailings, phone calls, and face-to-face communications all fell within its 
parameters. Additionally, action alerts urged advocacy action on a particular issue; they 
went beyond general encouragement to participate in the group's activities. Furthermore, 
action alerts did not necessarily specify a particular advocacy tactic. It was assumed, 
however, that most of the time they did suggest a particular form of action, as the NY AC 
example demonstrates. 
Advocacy Coalition. Coalitions are generally thought of as structured groups of 
individuals or organizations that come together to work on issues of common interest 
(McKay, 2001). "Coalitions provide a mechanism through which very separate and 
diverse organizations can cooperate and work together around a common goal" (Roberts-
DeGennnaro, 1986b, p. 248). Coalitions exist for a variety of reasons, including 
providing services, sharing information, conducting research and analysis, enhancing 
fundraising, or undertaking advocacy. Berry ( 1977) suggested that coalitions were 
structured along two dimensions: permanence and participation. Some coalitions are 
temporary alliances that meet only occasionally, with participation and resources possibly 
dependent on only one member. Other coalitions are more enduring and participatory, but 
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they "do not lend themselves to institutionalized or permanent arrangements" (Berry, 
1977, p. 258). However, still other coalitions, which Berry (1977) characterized as 
"independent coalitions," may last for years and have staff, offices, and a distinct identity 
separate from its members. 
For the purposes of this study, advocacy coalition was defined as a collection of 
organizational representatives working together through a unifying agency to influence 
the proposed or actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities. There were 
some key elements to this definition. Coalitions in the study that met this definition had 
separate staff, offices, and function from any of their members and operated with separate 
public and legal identities. Additionally, the primary purpose of the coalition was 
advocacy. Some scholars would label this type of coalition an interest group. As Berry 
(2003, p. 27) noted, "the general rule ofthumb among scholars is that if it lobbies, it's an 
interest group." Examples include Children Now in Oakland, California or the Children's 
Initiative in San Diego. 
Member. For the purposes of this study, member was defined as an individual 
carried on an advocacy coalition's contact list for action alerts. It was assumed that the 
members were individuals primarily representing their employer, with the sanction of 
their employer for participation, as opposed to autonomous individuals or organizations 
as members. It was also assumed that the members' incentives reflected a mixture of 
individual and organizational motives. 
Children. For the purposes of this study, children were defined as people aged 
zero through eighteen. This definition encompasses a range of populations commonly 
known as infants, children, and youth. 
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Review of Literature 
A discussion of forces that impact participation in advocacy begins with an 
examination of the role of organizational capacity. As Berry (2003, p. 124) stated, "the 
beginning point in understanding an organization's political ability is to ask simply, if a 
bit crudely, 'How much do they have?"' A number of studies have investigated this 
question. First, Krehely (2001) evaluated financial reports from agencies from across the 
spectrum of charities. He found that, comparatively speaking, larger organizations more 
typically reported lobbying expenses (Krehely, 2001). Similarly, De Vita et al. (2001) 
conducted an examination of child-focused nonprofits. Like Krehely, they also found that 
larger organizations were more likely to report lobbying expenditures than smaller 
agencies (De Vita et al., 2001). Findings from the Strengthening Nonprofit Advocacy 
Project (2002), a national research project by OMB Watch, Tufts University, and Charity 
Lobbying in the Public Interest, supported these conclusions as well. This project found 
that both budget size and staff size were significant predictors of public policy 
participation (Strengthening Nonprofit Advocacy Project, 2002). Agencies with annual 
expenses of $1 million or more were significantly more likely to participate in public 
policy activities than agencies with less than $1 million in expenses, and as the number of 
staff increased, organizations participated more in public policy as well (Strengthening 
Nonprofit Advocacy Project, 2002). Lobbying requires a substantial commitment of 
human and financial resources, which inhibits smaller organizations from participating in 
the legislative process (De Vita et al., 2001). In general, more resources lead to more 
advocacy. 
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Two other organizational factors have been shown to be related to participation in 
advocacy: job function and official duty. Ezell (1991) found that administrators and 
supervisors were more likely than direct-service staff members to set aside time for 
advocacy. This is consistent with the nature of advocacy as an external function. As part 
of their job function, administrators and supervisors are more responsible for activities 
external to the organization. Similarly, Ezell (1994) discovered that official duties had 
significant implications for the amount of advocacy conducted by social workers, with 
those officially assigned to conduct advocacy performing more advocacy than those not 
officially assigned to so. He found that more than 50% of social workers who reported 
that advocacy was part of their official duties engaged in five or more hours of advocacy 
per week, while only 2% of those who said that advocacy was not part of their official 
duties performed that much advocacy. From Ezell's two studies it appeared that both job 
function and official duties impacted participation in advocacy. However, these 
organizational factors do not alone account for differences in participation in advocacy: 
Underlying motivations play an important role too. 
Motivation is a hypothetical construct used to explain variations in behavior. Why 
do some individuals work harder than others? Motivation relates to voluntary behavior, 
not instinctive behavior nor involuntary action (Beck, 1983). Motivation cannot be seen, 
but it is assumed to exist. Researchers rely on theories to guide them towards its 
measurable manifestations (Pinder, 1984). As Herzberg (1990) asserted, "the psychology 
of motivation is tremendously complex, and what has been unraveled with any degree of 
assurance is small indeed" (p. 49). It is beyond the scope of this investigation to present 
an exhaustive discussion on motivation. Rather, this section will first briefly summarize 
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the basic philosophies on motivation in the workplace, then highlight the findings of 
some influential authors on motivation, and finally review the role that incentives play in 
advocacy coalitions. 
Beck (1983) suggested that there were four basic philosophies on motivation in 
the workplace. These viewpoints had influenced how managers thought and how they 
dealt with their workers. 
• "Rational-economic": the assumption that only economic forces motivated 
individuals, and that workers made rational decisions based on financial 
considerations. 
• "Social": that workers were primarily motivated by social needs. 
• "Self-actualizing": that individuals were intrinsically motivated; that feelings of 
pride, satisfaction, and the work itself drove behavior. 
• "Complex": that there was "a great variability in motives, emotions, experiences, 
and abilities of different people and that these change[ d] over time" (Beck, 1983, 
p. 3 78; italics in original). 
Maslow's (1970) "need hierarchy" theory certainly influenced many discussions 
on motivation. Maslow argued that psychological and physiological needs underpinned 
motivation and behavior. He structured needs in a hierarchy, starting at the lowest level 
with the physiological needs, such as food, then moving up through needs for safety, love 
and belonging, esteem, and finally to the need for self-actualization, that is, self-
fulfillment in finding one's calling. Lower-level needs would drive behavior until they 
were satisfied. Once satisfied, though, they would no longer drive behavior and the 
individual would become motivated to satisfy higher-level needs. However, theories on 
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motivation and behavior must account for levels and force; most behavior results from a 
combination of needs from varying levels and with differing degrees of intensity 
(Maslow, 1970). 
Pinder (1984) argued that there were two human factors related to productivity in 
the workplace: employee ability and employee motivation. He defined work motivation 
as "a set of energetic forces that originate both within as well as beyond an individual's 
being to initiate work related behaviors, and to determine its form, direction, intensity, 
and duration" (p. 8). These forces consisted of a mixture of needs, desires, and external 
factors. Vroom (1995) described several forces likely to impact motivation. First, people 
worked to gain wages. "Although economic factors undoubtedly play an important role in 
the decision to work, it is highly improbable that they are the only inducements" (p. 37). 
Additionally people wanted to expend mental or physical energy. Conditions did exist 
where action was preferred to idleness. People worked to contribute to the production of 
goods and services, to fulfill moral purposes, and to experience social interactions and 
fellowship. Finally, social status influenced motivation in the workplace, because "a 
person's occupation greatly influences the way in which other people respond to him 
outside the work situation" (p. 48). Vroom asserted that motivation in the workplace was 
a confluence of these forces and the choices individuals made were based on the 
probability that particular efforts would lead to particular, valuable outcomes. As the 
expectation of valuable outcomes increased, so effort would increase. 
Barnard (1938) asserted that organizations brought about the actions of 
individuals through the range of incentives they provided. Material incentives, such as 
money or other physical things, were provided as inducements for service or reward for 
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contributions. However, he believed, personal, non-material incentives, for example, 
opportunities for prestige or distinction, played a more important role than material 
incentives. Desirable physical conditions at work, associational attractiveness, and the 
opportunity for participation in important events also served as inducements. But one of 
the most powerful incentives was ideal benefaction: the "capacity of organizations to 
satisfy personal ideals usually relating to non-material, future, or altruistic relations" (p. 
146). Examples included loyalty, patriotism, pride of workmanship, and altruistic service 
for family or others. Political organizations could not survive without the capacity to 
satisfy these personal, altruistic ideals. Finally, the condition of communion, which 
Barnard described as the "opportunity for comradeship, for mutual support in personal 
attitudes" (p. 148), completed his inventory of incentives. He pointed out that personal 
motives were neither a universal attribute nor a steady-state function. "Different men are 
moved by different incentives or combinations of incentives and by different incentives 
or combinations at different times" (p. 148). 
Yet even given the great variability and dynamic nature of incentives, Clark and 
Wilson (1961) claimed that the "incentive system may be regarded as the principal 
variable affecting organizational behavior" (p. 130). They categorized incentives as well, 
emphasizing that particular incentives impacted people differently and that changes in the 
economy, distribution of resources, morals, expectations, and attitudes transformed 
personal motives over time. Material incentives were "rewards that have a monetary 
value or can be easily translated into ones that have" (p. 134). Solidary incentives 
originated from "socializing, congeniality, [and] the sense of group membership and 
identification" (p. 134). Solidary incentives tended to exist independently of the goals of 
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the organization. On the other hand, purposive incentives were primarily derived from the 
goals of the organization. Organizational members were motivated by efforts to alter the 
status quo on behalf of nonmembers, for example "the demand for the enactment of 
certain laws or the adoption of certain practices (which do not benefit the members in any 
direct tangible way)" (p. 135; italics in original). The value of the goals themselves 
motivated effort. Nevertheless, Clark and Wilson believed that for purposive 
organizations, such as advocacy groups, "fewer people are willing to accept 
organizational purposes as a primary incentive than are willing to accept material or 
solidary inducements" (p. 151 ). 
Herzberg (1990), however, argued, "It is only when one has a generator of one's 
own that we can talk about motivation. One then needs no outside stimulation. One wants 
to do it" (p. 52; italics in original). Intrinsic motivators, such as the work itself, 
responsibility, and growth led to job satisfaction and increased motivation. On the other 
hand, separate and distinct extrinsic factors, such as company policies, interpersonal 
relationships, working conditions, and salary, were the primary sources of job 
dissatisfaction and could reduce motivation. Herzberg proposed that job enrichment, 
through increases in responsibility, opportunities for personal achievement, recognition, 
and growth, led to job satisfaction and motivation. While the aforementioned authors 
provided valuable insight on motivation that can be applied to an examination of 
participation in advocacy coalitions, other authors addressed this topic more directly. 
In his exchange theory of interest groups Salisbury (1969, p. 2) postulated that the 
"origins, growth, death, and associated lobby activity" of interest groups could be 
explained by an exchange relationship between interest group entrepreneurs and 
16 
prospective members. Interest group entrepreneurs, the organizers, leaders, and initiators 
of the group, offered a mixture of incentives to potential members at a set price: 
membership, which might range in practice from a supportive signature to heavy dues. 
Salisbury conceptualized both material and solidary incentives as described by Clark and 
Wilson. But rather than purposive benefits, which were derived primarily from 
organizational goals, he preferred the notion of expressive benefits. These benefits 
provided mechanisms for the public expression of values, and people were willing to join 
groups primarily to express their values. 
Essentially, the exchange theory asserted that in order for interest groups to 
remain viable, there must be a mutually satisfactory exchange between the potential 
member and the entrepreneur (Salisbury, 1969). For the potential member, if the 
incentives warranted the price of membership, then they joined the interest group, 
satisfied, while at the same time, the entrepreneurs' incentives must maintain the 
necessary flow ofbenefits to their group. If the incentives failed to attract sufficient 
membership at the set price, or the price failed to keep the group solvent, then the interest 
group collapsed. Basically, the success of the organization depended on the quality of the 
entrepreneurship. Group leaders must find the appropriate balance between incentives 
and price. Salisbury's exchange theory held that group members were willing to give in 
exchange for an incentive. However, Salisbury's members were generally limited to 
donors and dues payers. While these types of member were certainly important to interest 
groups, Hula ( 1999) applied the exchange theory to members' actions beyond the 
exchange point of joining a group. 
17 
Hula ( 1999) argued that the incentives motivating a group to join a coalition 
strongly influenced the role the group played within the coalition once they joined. More 
specifically, he contended that differences in coalition members' work levels were 
closely correlated with the reasons why the members had joined the coalition. Hula 
divided coalition members into the three groups: core members, specialists (or players), 
and peripheral (or tag-along) members. Core members were coalition founders and other 
resource-rich groups that typically brokered the initial emergence of the coalition or 
joined a coalition to achieve strategic policy goals. Motivated to bring about strategic 
victory, core groups carried out a high level of coalition work towards the overall goal. 
They were "generally willing to commit time and effort to carrying the coalition's 
platform into battle" (p. 50). Specialists also joined coalitions to achieve policy goals, but 
their reasons for joining were tactical: rather than pursuing broad strategic goals, 
specialist groups sought to include their particular goals in the coalition's platform and 
insert specific provisions within the legislation at hand. Their work level and "lobbying 
efforts in the legislative arena ... tend to be focused on their specific piece ofthe issue or 
legislation rather than the package as a whole" (p. 44). Lastly, peripheral groups joined 
coalitions for non-policy incentives, such as information or benefits related to symbolic 
participation in the coalition. While generally supportive of the coalition's goals, 
peripheral groups lacked a "willingness to expend significant resources to achieve the 
eventual policy goal that serves as the focus of the coalition" (p. 46). These groups 
typically maintained a low work level for coalition activities. As Hula summed it up, not 
all of the coalition members in his study were interested in getting a bill passed: "the core 
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members wanted the bill [passed]; the players wanted a paragraph; and the peripheral 
groups wanted a picture for their newsletter" (p. 135). 
Hula ( 1999) also recognized the dynamic characteristics of motives, noting that a 
group's position within a coalition and their corresponding level of work might change 
over time. For instance, as the particular goals of a coalition shifted, groups may move 
back and forth from the positions of specialist and peripheral as the relevance of the 
issues to their organizations and constituents waxed and waned. Furthermore, core 
members were not limited to founders and other resource rich groups. "Other groups may 
become core members if they have strong commitment to the overall coalition goal and 
are willing to devote time, energy, and other resources to coalition work" (p. 43). 
Notwithstanding the general dearth of studies of the role that incentives play in 
participation in advocacy coalitions, some studies touched upon this topic. First, Berry's 
(1977) study found that membership services and publications were not important 
incentives and that the role of solidary incentives varied greatly even within single 
organizations. Berry ( 1977) also concluded that "purposive incentives are the most 
important type of incentives for public interest groups" (p. 42). These incentives "make it 
possible for most public interest groups to operate" (p. 43). Next, Weisner's (1983) 
analysis of the coalition building process for human service agencies in the San Francisco 
Bay area revealed that ideological, friendship, and altruistic reasons, along with increased 
publicity, all played a role in the decision-making process to join advocacy coalitions. 
Weisner (1983) also found a strong relationship between membership in coalitions and 
perceived threats to an organization's funding. By and large, groups joined advocacy 
coalitions to protest cuts in programs and to generate new revenue streams, with 
19 
advancement of their own programs and constituencies a primary concern. The most 
frequently cited benefit of joining a coalition, however, was the "enhanced ability to 
gather and exchange information in an increasingly volatile and complex human services 
field" (Weisner, 1983, p. 304). 
Similarly, Cruz (2001) found that human service agencies in New Yorkjoined 
interest groups, such as the New York State Association of Community and Residential 
Agencies, to analyze and exchange information on public policies and government 
budgets. In general, agencies joined to advance their political and fiscal prospects. 
Agency leaders saw membership in associations as a tool to promote their cause through 
a unifying structure that also provided additional resources such as staff lobbyists. 
However, the most important benefit for joining was fiscal. As one executive director in 
the study stated, "without anybody there to look at the state budget, I think it's fairly 
obvious we would be in a disastrous position" (quoted at p. 82). Finally, Walker's (1991) 
study of interest groups operating in Washington, D.C. reported that, from the perspective 
of interest group leaders, purposive benefits consistently received high rankings on the 
relative importance ofbenefits in attracting members, with most group leaders reporting 
that solidary benefits were not nearly as important an incentive. "These group leaders 
clearly believe that the maintenance of their organizations depends on their success as 
representatives for their members or as advocates for a cause" (p. 92). 
In summary, the literature provided a number of useful insights that guided this 
study. First, while it appeared certain that an organization's ability to participate in 
advocacy depended on its resources, the investigation on the role of organizational 
capacity was not yet complete. How did organizational capacity influence an individual's 
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ability to participate in advocacy? Next, Ezell's ( 1991, 1994) investigations on the impact 
of official duty and job function on participation in advocacy revealed the importance of 
these factors. However, Ezell's studies did not specifically address advocacy through 
coalitions. Finally, the literature on motivation and interest groups provided a great deal 
of direction for this study. There is an immense amount of complexity and variability in 
the motives that drive people and groups. Clearly, the behavior of individuals and 
organizations derives from a wide range of motives generated from both internal and 
external forces, such as needs for safety, material gains, moral fulfillment, interpersonal 
relations, and altruistic drives, to name a few. Additionally, motives are not universal, nor 
are they steady state. Equally importantly, different motives appear to impact behavior 
differently: some incentives are stronger motivators than others. Yet the literature is 
inconclusive and contradictory at times. Are intrinsic motives, such as responsibility, 
really more powerful than extrinsic incentives, such as financial gains? Furthermore, 
motives are not an ali-or-nothing element to behavior. More than one motive, and with 
varying degrees of intensity, could be powering actions. In fact, people's behavior could 
be driven by a combination of their personal desires and their organizations' needs. 
Additionally, members join advocacy coalitions for a wide range of reasons, and different 
motives are tied to different roles and work levels. However, once again, the literature 
seems inconclusive. Are material rewards or altruistic ideals more central to participation 
in interest groups? Finally, while a wide range of incentives motivates action, it is 
possible to develop groups of similar incentives in order to facilitate the empirical 
specification and measurement of motivation. Without such specifications, the features of 
this hypothetical, but important, construct would remain unknown. To that end, this study 
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tested a series of hypotheses and explored a number of questions in order to enhance the 
understanding of motivation and its role in advocacy coalitions. 
Delineation of Research Questions 
Hypothesis 1 
The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to correlates with the 
incentives that motivated them to join the coalition. 
This investigation tested the relationship between the number of action alerts 
members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and incentives. For the 
purposes of this study, incentives were categorized as strategic, resource development, 
and fellowship. This hypothesis predicted that there would be significant differences in 
the number of action alerts that coalition members responded to based upon whether the 
members had been primarily motivated by strategic, resource development, or fellowship 
incentives to join the coalition. The project also explored how incentives shifted over 
time. Turning to action alerts, the study explored the frequency of action alerts received 
by coalition members and examined the similarities and differences between the 
advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics conducted by 
coalition members. 
Hypothesis 2 
The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to correlates with 
their role in the coalition. 
This investigation tested the relationship between the number of the action alerts 
members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and their role in the 
coalition. For the purposes of this study, roles were categorized as core, partner, and 
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peripheral. The hypothesis predicted that there would be significant differences in the 
number of action alerts coalition members responded to depending on whether their role 
in the coalition was core, partner, or peripheral. This investigation also explored the 
relationships between role and incentives. 
Hypothesis 3 
Coalition members who have advocacy as part of their official duties will respond 
to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members who do not have 
advocacy as part of their official duties. 
This examination tested the relationship between the number of action alerts 
members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and the presence or absence 
of advocacy specified among their official duties. This hypothesis predicted that coalition 
members that participated in advocacy activities as part of their official duties would 
respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than coalition members that did 
not have advocacy as part of their official duties. This study also explored the association 
between official duties and incentives. 
Hypothesis 4 
Managers will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than 
direct-service providers. 
This examination tested the relationship between the number of action alerts 
members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and their job function. This 
hypothesis predicted that coalition members whose primary job function was 
management would respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than 
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members whose primary job function was to provide services directly to clients. This 
study also explored the relationship between job function and incentives. 
Hypothesis 5 
Coalition members from larger organizations will respond to a significantly 
greater number of action alerts than members from smaller organizations. 
This hypothesis built on the evidence at hand: larger organizations tended to 
participate more in public policy. Would such predictors of public policy participation 
hold true at the level of the individual participant? It was predicted that coalition 
members from larger organizations would respond to a significantly greater number of 
action alerts than members from smaller organizations. This study also explored the 
relationship between organizational size and incentives. 
So far, these hypotheses and exploratory research questions tended to seek 
motivations separately. But in reality these factors probably did not operate in isolation; 
they likely operated simultaneously. In order to gain a yet clearer picture of the 
relationships among these factors, this study explored how incentives, role, official duty, 
job function, and organizational capacity in conjunction impact the number of action 
alerts to which coalition members responded. 
Contributions to the Field 
The aim was to add to the current body of knowledge in a number of important 
ways. First of all, given the complexity of the concept of motivation, questions certainly 
remained about the relationships between incentives and action. The study could add 
more empirical evidence to this multifaceted construct. Next, the vast majority of the 
literature on advocacy virtually ignored human service groups, whereas this study might 
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bring much-needed attention to child-focused advocacy groups. In fact, as McCarthy and 
Castelli (200 1) strongly emphasized, the study of advocacy needed expansion in order to 
develop a more comprehensive understanding of advocacy within the nonprofit sector. 
Moreover, while recognizing that some researchers had examined the interest group 
phenomenon in the nonprofit sector (Berry, 1977; Hula, 1999; Walker, 1991 ), these 
researchers had focused predominately on national organizations based in Washington, 
D.C. In contrast, this study focused on local and statewide groups in California. This was 
an important distinction because state and local groups had different practices as 
compared to their national counterparts (Reid, 2000). Additionally, although the 
investigation was partly modeled on Hula's (1999) argument that the incentives 
motivating a potential group member's decision to join a coalition were tied to the 
member's work level for the coalition, Hula's conceptualization of work level included a 
wide range of activities, even internal meetings, whereas this study narrowed the focus to 
the question of response to action alerts. This tighter focus provided clarity to arguably 
the most important activity for members of advocacy coalitions: heeding the call to 
action. Furthermore, Hula had studied interest groups in general as members of advocacy 
coalitions, whereas this study examined service providers in particular. This is an 
important distinction because Hula's groups had primarily been policy actors joining 
together in coalitions, whereas this study examined actors moving from a role primarily 
in service provision to an expanded role in policy. 
Furthermore, considering that the literature was nearly devoid of studies on 
advocacy as dependent on official duty or job function, this examination added empirical 
evidence to these important, yet considerably under-researched, factors. Many of the 
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studies that had tested the relationship between organizational size and advocacy had 
drawn on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sources, yet De Vita et al. (2001) and Krehely 
(200 1) had acknowledged this as a key weakness in their studies. "IRS reporting 
requirements do not capture many advocacy activities" (De Vita et al., 2001, p. 32). 
Instead of relying on financial data to determine levels of advocacy activity, this study 
aimed to enrich the picture by utilizing additional measures of advocacy activity. Lastly, 
current knowledge was also enhanced by investigating advocacy activities specifically 
associated with advocacy coalitions. Previous studies, particularly those based on IRS 
documents, had failed to differentiate between advocacy activities conducted 
independently of advocacy coalitions and advocacy activities conducted with advocacy 
coalitions. In summary, this study added to the current body of knowledge by examining 
a unique combination of factors and their relationships to heeding the call to action. This 
added important new insights to the understanding of child-focused advocacy coalitions 
and, hopefully, would help these groups build a stronger voice for children. 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the methodology that was used to investigate the hypotheses 
and exploratory research questions presented in Chapter 1, specifically the topics of 
research design, description of subjects, operational definitions, procedures, treatment of 
data, limitations, and ethical considerations. 
Research Design 
For this empirical study, a nomothetic approach was utilized as the broad 
methodological framework. As such, the research sought to identify factors that were 
generally associated with the number of calls to action members of child-focused 
advocacy coalitions responded to. More specifically, it was a cross-sectional, 
quantitative, mail survey that contained both explanatory and exploratory elements. 
Explanatory Elements 
• Hypothesis 1: The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to 
correlates with the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition. 
• Hypothesis 2: The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to 
correlates with their role in the coalition. 
• Hypothesis 3: Coalition members who have advocacy as part oftheir official 
duties will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members 
who do not have advocacy as part of their official duties. 
• Hypothesis 4: Managers will respond to a significantly greater number of action 
alerts than direct-service providers. 
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• Hypothesis 5: Coalition members from larger organizations will respond to a 
significantly greater number of action alerts than members from smaller 
organizations. 
Exploratory Elements 
• Exploratory Question 1: How do incentives shift over time, if at all? 
• Exploratory Question 2: What is the frequency of action alerts received by 
coalition members? 
• Exploratory Question 3: What are the similarities and differences between the 
advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics conducted by 
coalition members? 
• Exploratory Question 4: What is the association between role and incentives? 
• Exploratory Question 5: What is the association between official duties and 
incentives? 
• Exploratory Question 6: What is the association between job function and 
incentives? 
• Exploratory Question 7: What is the association between the organizational size 
and incentives? 
• Exploratory Question 8: How do incentives, role, official duty, job function, and 
organizational capacity in conjunction impact the number of action alerts to which 
coalition members respond? 
Subjects 
The subjects of this study were individuals that met two primary criteria: they 
worked at California nonprofit organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the 
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Internal Revenue Code; 2) they were also named on action alert contact lists of child-
focused advocacy coalitions in California. This was the appropriate population and unit 
of analysis for the research questions, because for the coalitions included in this study, 
the relevant individuals were those who had joined by adding their names to an action 
alert list, who had received action alerts urging advocacy, and who had heeded the call to 
action on behalf of children. Nonetheless, these individuals were primarily representing 
their employer in the coalitions' activities. For the subjects of this study, their employers 
were nonprofit organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. It was assumed that the subjects' employers were service-based public charities. It 
was also assumed that the subjects were adults, ages 18 or older, with a mix of male and 
female subjects. 
Operational Definitions of Concepts and Variables 
The questionnaire titled "Survey of California Nonprofit Organizations" (see 
Appendix A) served as the instrument for operationally defining the concepts and 
variables in this study. Part I asked subjects about their membership in groups; such 
groups were the child-focused advocacy coalitions preselected to participate in this study. 
Question 1 sought to confirm that the subjects met subject criterion number 2 as 
described previously. This study's definition of"member" was included in the 
instructions for Question 1, which operationally defined the term and verified that the 
subjects were indeed members of the child-focused advocacy coalitions participating in 
this study; to eliminate responses from other organizations, respondents who indicated 
"none of the above" were instructed to return the questionnaire. If any individual subject 
was a member of more than one of the groups listed, then Question 1 a asked the subject 
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to select the group with which they considered themselves most active during the 
previous twelve months. This provided consistency in the responses for subjects in more 
than one group. Question 2 asked subjects to report their length of group membership. 
This question was linked to the exploratory question 1. 
Question 3 asked subjects to characterize their role in the group. This question 
operationally defined role in hypothesis 2 and was linked to exploratory questions 4 and 
8. Questions 4 through 7 collected information on incentives. For this section, questions 
about reasons, were, in fact, asking about incentives. Question 4 inquired about the 
incentives that had motivated subjects to join child-focused advocacy coalitions. For this 
study, incentives were categorized as strategic, resource development, or fellowship. 
These incentives were the independent variables for hypothesis 1 and also linked to 
exploratory questions 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Question 4 utilized a composite measure to 
operationally define each of these incentives. Strategic incentives were operationally 
defined by combining level-of-influence scores from the following items: bringing about 
social change to benefit others, expressing important personal values, achieving broad 
goals, and providing altruistic service for others. Resource development incentives were 
operationally defined by combining scores from these items: advancing one's 
organization, protesting cuts in its funding, generating revenue for it, and maximizing 
flow of money to it. Fellowship incentives were operationally defined by combining 
scores from these items: associating with like-minded individuals, networking with 
colleagues, obtaining mutual support in personal attitudes, and developing new 
friendships. Question 6 relied on the same composite measure typology as Question 4 to 
operationally define the incentives. This question was linked to exploratory question 1. 
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Recognizing that questions 4 and 6 probably did not cover the full range of possible 
reasons why the subjects had joined child-focused advocacy coalitions, Questions 5 and 7 
allowed for some open-ended input. Answers to these questions enhanced the exploratory 
dimension of this study. 
Part II ofthe survey was about action alerts. This study's definition of action alert 
was included in the instructions for this section. Question 8 asked about the frequency of 
action alerts that subjects had received, and was linked to exploratory question 2. 
Question 9 asked the subjects to make a best guess at the percentage of the total action 
alerts they had acted on during the previous twelve months. This question operationally 
defined the dependent variable included in hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4, along with 
exploratory question 8. Question 10 asked subjects to indicate what advocacy activities 
they had been urged to perform in the action alerts they had received, and also asked 
them to indicate whether they had performed the requested activity at least once. This 
question operationally defined advocacy by listing 21 activities that could influence the 
proposed or actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities on behalf of 
children. Recognizing that this question did not cover all possible advocacy tactics, the 
question also provided a mechanism for subjects to include additional advocacy activities 
in their response. Like question 8, this question was linked to the study's exploration on 
action alerts. In this case, though, Question 10 was tied to exploratory question 3. Part III 
of the survey was about the subjects' employers. Question 11 operationally defined 
public charity and sought to confirm that the subjects met subject criterion number 1. 
Since only organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
qualified for the tax-deductible benefit, asking whether contributions to their organization 
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were tax-deductible verified that that criterion was met. If contributions were not tax-
deductible for a respondent's organization, Question lla collected information on what 
type of organization best described their organization. 
The next section of this chapter details procedures that were used to minimize 
unqualified potential subjects from receiving the survey. Question 12 asked subjects to 
indicate their primary job function as one of the following: provider of services to clients, 
management, or other. This question operationally defined the independent variables for 
hypothesis 4 and also provided input for exploratory questions 6 and 8. Question 13 
asked subjects if advocacy was part of their job description. Tied to hypothesis 3, this 
question operationally defined the independent variable official duty as having advocacy 
as part of the subject's job description. This question also provided input for exploratory 
questions 5 and 8. Questions 14 and 15 were linked to hypothesis 5 and exploratory 
questions 7 and 8. Question 14 operationally defined the independent variable 
organizational size as number of paid staff members, while question 15 operationally 
defined organizational size as budget size in dollars. 
Procedures 
Selection of Subjects 
Selection of subjects began with the development of a list of child-focused 
advocacy coalitions in California. This list was initially developed using the publicly 
available Internet search engine located at http://www.google.com. Key word searches 
using the words advocacy, coalition, child, children, youth, and California, among others, 
were conducted in order to develop a list of organizations that merited further review. 
Next, the Internet homepages of the organizations on this initial list were reviewed to 
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determine whether the organizations fell within this study's definition and description of 
child-focused advocacy coalition. Each of the organizations that appeared to meet the 
definition was contacted by phone or email to confirm that it did, in fact, qualify for the 
study. Specifically, was the organization serving as a unifying agency through which 
organizational representatives were working collectively to influence the proposed or 
actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities on behalf of children? Did 
the organization's members include representatives from public charities? Did the 
organization maintain an action alert contact list? If the organization did qualify, then a 
request was made to provide the researcher with its action alert contact list. Recognizing 
that the privacy of contact information on action alert lists might be an important factor in 
an organization's decision to share their list, in order to facilitate participation in the 
study, the researcher supplied organizations with information on the study, answered 
questions, and provided assurances that the contact lists would be used only for this study 
and that only the researcher would have access to the lists. A snowballing technique was 
used to develop further the number of child-focused advocacy coalitions participating in 
the study. All organizations that were contacted were asked for leads to other potentially 
appropriate organizations. 
In the end, advocacy alert contact lists from four child-focused advocacy 
coalitions were selected for inclusion in this study. Coalition A was a statewide coalition 
of approximately 500 members that focused on critically important issues, like teen 
pregnancy and violence. Coalition A had six staff and an annual budget of about 
$500,000. Coalition B was a statewide coalition of 83 members that focused on maternal 
and child health, public health, and nutrition. Coalition B had 4 staff and an annual 
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budget of about $1.5 million. Coalition C was a statewide coalition of about 17 5 
members that represented over twenty child-related issues. Coalition C was part of the 
school oflaw of a private university in California. Eight staff worked in the university's 
center that provided leadership for Coalition C. Coalition D was a local coalition of about 
1400 members that covered essentially all of the issues that faced children in a single 
metropolitan area. Coalition D had six staff and an annual budget of approximately 
$700,000. Selection of these coalitions was based, in part, on the availability and 
willingness of child-focused advocacy coalitions to participate. Selection was also based 
purposively, using the study's definition and description of child-focused advocacy 
coalition as a guide to develop a pool of advocacy coalitions that most precisely met the 
merits of the definition and the focus of this study. 
Selection of subjects continued after the child-focused advocacy coalitions 
provided the researcher with their action alert contact lists. The contact lists were 
reviewed and edited to promote accurate subject selection with regards to the public 
charity criteria. Individuals without an organizational affiliation, individuals with a 
governmental affiliation, and employees of the unifying agency (i.e., the organization that 
provided the list) were deleted from the contact lists. Next, the lists were combined and 
sorted to search for individuals that belonged to more than one advocacy coalition. 
Duplicate names were eliminated from all but one contact list in order to give all 
potential subjects an equal chance of being selected and to prevent over-sampling of 
more active individuals. The contact lists were then sorted back to group individuals by 
their original contact list. In order to ensure that individuals from each advocacy coalition 
were sufficiently included in the sample a probability proportionate to size (PPS) 
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sampling procedure was utilized. More specifically, the total number of potential subjects 
was calculated by adding up the number of individuals from each contact list. This 
number was divided by 400 in order to calculate a number (X) to use for systematic 
random sampling. A random starting point was determined and then every Xth individual 
from each contact list was selected on a rotating basis until 400 potential subjects were 
selected. 
Gathering and Storing of Information 
Information was gathered through a postal mail survey. Four hundred potential 
subjects received a maximum of three contacts by postal mail. An initial introductory and 
consent cover letter (see Appendix B), a survey and a pre-addressed, pre-stamped 
envelope were sent to all400 potential subjects on March 15, 2004. Potential subjects 
that did not respond by March 24,2004 were sent a reminder post card (see Appendix C). 
Potential subjects that did not respond by April 9, 2004 were sent one final introductory 
and consent cover letter (see Appendix D), a survey and a pre-addressed, pre-stamped 
envelope. No experimental manipulations or interventions were conducted. Information 
was recorded and stored in locked filing cabinets and password-protected Microsoft 
Word, Microsoft Excel, and SPSS computer files; only the researcher had access to the 
locked and password-protected files. 
Treatment ofData 
Several statistical analyses were used to treat the data. Broadly speaking, the 
selection of statistical technique was based on the number of variables under 
examination, on the level of measurement ofthose variables- for instance, nominal, 
ordinal, or interval - and on whether the researcher sought a descriptive or inferential 
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finding. Additionally, the level of significance was set at .05 for all statistical tests. To 
start, each of the variables in the hypotheses and exploratory research questions was 
examined using mode, mean, median, and frequency/percent distributions, where 
appropriate. This series of analyses provided an initial body of findings before the 
variables were plugged into the hypotheses and exploratory questions for testing. 
First, for hypothesis 1, the treatment of data began with Crombach's index of 
internal consistency on the items comprising each of the composite measures of 
incentives. This hypothesis was tested using Pearson's product-moment correlation and a 
stepwise regression analysis. Next, hypothesis 2 was tested using a one-way ANOV A 
analyses. Hypothesis 2 was also examined using crosstabulations and chi-square by 
recoding action from an interval variable to an ordinal variable. Since both hypotheses 3 
and 4 consisted of dichotomous independent variables and an interval dependent variable, 
two-sample t-tests for independent samples were used. Finally, data for hypothesis 5 were 
tested in two ways. First, the relationship between the interval independent variable 
number of paid staff members was tested against the interval dependent variable using 
Pearson's product-moment correlation. Secondly, the ordinal variable budget size was 
tested against the recoded action variable using crosstabulations and chi-square. 
The exploratory questions were examined using a variety of techniques to 
uncover important facets of the data. Frequency/percent distributions provided much of 
the data treatment of exploratory questions 2 and 3. Exploratory questions 1, 4, 5, 6, and 
7 were examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation, two-sample t-tests, 
crosstabulations, chi-square, and ANOV A, where appropriate. 
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Limitations 
This study had several limitations. First, it was limited by its design. While 
nomothetic, quantitative research provides a mechanism to identify causal factors that 
generally impact a class of conditions, it is potentially limited in its richness of 
examination. This design forwent a deep, qualitative investigation of incentives, 
advocacy, and child-focused advocacy coalitions in favor of testing a limited number of 
hypotheses in order to detect patterns. Additionally, it was limited to the definitions 
prescribed for the concepts and variables under investigation. In order to promote mutual 
understanding among interested parties and to facilitate quality research, each of the 
definitions intentionally limited the examination. For instance, the definition of 
"member" assumed that coalition members had the sanction of their organizations for 
participation in the coalitions' activities. However, in actuality, this might not have been 
the case. Furthermore, while this study attempted to explain variability in the number of 
action alerts responded to by applying a template of incentive theories, perhaps other 
theories, based on different assumptions, might have afforded clarity and answers 
obscured by the limited view incentive theory provided. Next, the nature of incentives 
presented limits. Incentives are a dynamic attribute, and they could have changed prior to, 
during, or even after the research took place. Moreover, this study did not attempt to 
isolate personal motives from organizational incentives. Rather, it assumed action was 
driven by a combination of these forces. Nor did it address some potentially critical 
factors. For example, the processes involved in weighing the study's limited number of 
positive incentives against any number of unknown negative incentives or barriers 
remained hidden. 
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The study's procedures potentially limited the investigation as well. The 
coalitions that participated in this study were a more formalized subset of the larger group 
of child-focused advocacy coalitions. Less formalized coalitions - for instance coalitions 
without separate staff, offices, or legal identities from their members and coalitions 
formed under temporary or ad hoc arrangements- were excluded from this study. 
Additionally, by using the Internet and snowball techniques to develop a group of child-
focused advocacy coalitions to participate in the study, other relevant advocacy 
coalitions, not detected by these methods, were excluded from the study. In fact, the 
study was limited to the advocacy coalitions and their members that participated in the 
study, and the findings should not be generalized beyond them. Also, purposive selection 
of advocacy coalitions and editing of advocacy alert contact lists lends itself to inherent 
conscious and unconscious bias. Additionally, relying on subjects' memory may have led 
to inaccurate data collection. Subjects may have over-emphasized some incentives as 
reasons for joining advocacy coalitions and over-reported the numbers of action alerts 
responded to in a self-congratulatory way. Other methods of data collection on advocacy, 
such as referring to evidence in primary sources like letters written or records of 
testimony, might have supplied more accurate information. 
Ethical Considerations 
This study's investigation considered the rights of its subjects. To begin with, 
participation in the research was voluntary and occurred only after a disclosure of the 
possible risks. The introductory consent and cover letter (Appendix B) detailed both the 
voluntary nature and possible risks of this project and provided a reasonable level of 
informed consent to potential subjects. While the study did not afford the protection of 
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anonymity to its subjects, several measures were taken to ensure that the subjects' 
identities would in fact remain confidential. Surveys were numerically coded and return 
envelopes were separated from completed surveys in order to protect the subjects' 
identities. All records remained, and will remain, permanently confidential, only the 
researcher having access to the coded and locked files; identities will not be revealed in 
any reports, publications, or conversations resulting from the study. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the research. The level of significance was set 
at .05 for all statistical tests. The data supported hypothesis 1 but failed to support 
hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
Overview of Responses 
Response Rate 
A total of 194 responses to the survey were received. However, some were 
excluded from the study. Twenty-nine were excluded because they were returned 
indicating that the potential subjects were no longer employed at that address, while an 
additional 12 were returned as undeliverable as addressed. Additionally, using survey 
Question 11 as a guide, 1 0 responses were excluded because the respondents did not meet 
subject criterion 1; that is, they did not work at California nonprofit organizations 
organized under Section 501(c)(3) ofthe Internal Revenue Code. Two responses were 
from nonprofit organizations not organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 5 from local, state, or federal government agencies, 1 from a for-profit 
organization, and 2 were indeterminable. Finally, 23 responses were excluded because 
the respondents did not meet subject criterion 2: they did not appear on the action alert 
contact lists of the child-focused advocacy coalitions participating in this study. In sum, 
120 responses were used for the study, for a final valid response rate of 36.8%. These 
responses constituted the subjects of the study (N = 120). The subjects were affiliated 
with child, youth, or family-related organizations located throughout California in both 
rural and urban settings. Nearly all of the subjects' organizations were social service, 
educational, recreational, or healthcare agencies. It should be noted that not every subject 
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completed the survey in its entirety; actual sample sizes (n) for particular tests and per-
ceil calculations are presented throughout this chapter. 
Advocacy Coalition Membership 
Table 1 shows the results of coalition membership as the subjects indicated in 
question 1 ofthe survey. This table shows that the largest portion of subjects were 
members of Coalition D (n = 50). 
Table 1 
Summary of Coalition Membership 
Coalitions 
Coalition A 
Coalition B 
Coalition C 
Coalition D 
% 
31.7 
13.3 
25.8 
41.7 
n 
38 
16 
31 
50 
N= 120 
Note. Total percentage is greater than 100% because 15 subjects were members of more 
than one advocacy coalition. 
Results of Explanatory Elements 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 brought together the central elements ofthis study: incentives and 
action. The number of action alerts that coalition members responded to correlates with 
the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition. Starting with an examination of 
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incentives, Table 2 highlights key results from Question 4 of the survey, which asked the 
subjects to report what reasons initially motivated them to join the advocacy coalition 
they selected in Question 1. This table shows that more than 50% of the subjects (n = 65) 
indicated that bringing about social change to benefit others had a significant influence 
on their decision to join the advocacy coalition, whereas more than 40% of the subjects (n 
= 47) reported that generating revenue for their organization had no influence on their 
decision. 
Table 2 
Most and Least Influential Reasons to Join Coalitions 
Reasons % 
Most Frequent Significant Influencea 
Bring about social change to benefit others 
Network with colleagues 
Achieve broad goals 
55.6 
35.6 
32.2 
Most Frequent No Influenceb 
Generate revenue for your organization 
Maximize flow of money to your organization 
Develop new friendships 
41.6 
39.6 
27.9 
n 
65 
42 
37 
47 
44 
31 
aSignificant influence equals score of 4 on survey; bno influence equals score of 0. 
However, as described in Chapter 3, this study used composite measures of the 
items in Question 4 of the survey to test this hypothesis. Specifically, strategic incentives 
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were calculated by combining scores from the items "bring about social change to benefit 
others," "express important personal values," "achieve broad goals," and "provide 
altruistic service for others"; resource development incentives were calculated by 
combining scores from the items "advance your organization," "protest cuts in funding to 
your organization," "generate revenue for your organization," and "maximize flow of 
money to your organization"; and fellowship incentives were calculated by combining 
scores from the items "associate with like-minded individuals," "network with 
colleagues," "obtain mutual support in personal attitudes," and "develop new 
friendships." Referring again to Table 2, it is noteworthy that two of the items that 
formed strategic incentives were among the three most frequent "significant influence" 
items, whereas, in contrast, two of the items that formed resource development incentives 
made up two of the top three most frequent "no influence" items. 
Next, examinations using Crombach's index of internal consistency were 
performed on each of the composite incentives. Resource development incentives had the 
highest alpha at .7789, followed by fellowship incentives with an alpha of .6938, and 
strategic incentives with an alpha of .5618. A review ofthese findings merited keeping 
the composite incentives as originally formulated. The means for each of the composite 
incentives were calculated as well. As shown in Table 3, strategic incentives had the 
highest mean score at M= 10.47 (SD = 2.978), whereas resource development incentives 
had the lowest mean at M = 6.96 (SD = 4.264). 
Additionally, Question 5 of the survey provided an opportunity for subjects to 
report other reasons that motivated them to join the advocacy coalition. By far the most 
frequently stated other reason, with 22 subjects so reporting, was to acquire information. 
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For example, Subject 254 stated that he or she joined "to receive updated current 
information on a regular basis regarding children's issues." The next most frequently 
cited reason for joining was the quality of the advocacy coalition or its staff (n = 1 0). As 
Subject 368 stated, "[Coalition D] is a visionary, action oriented, big hearted organization 
committed to making a huge difference for children, youth and families." Or, as Subject 
167 reported, "support due to excellent Executive Director [and] staff." Interestingly, 
only one subject reported that he or she "was asked to join" was the primary reason 
(Subject 277). Finally, Subject 366 asserted, "I don't do it for the money, I do it for the 
justice." 
Table 3 
Means of Incentives to Join Coalitions 
Composite Measures M 
Strategic Incentives 10.4 7 
Resource Development Incentives 6.96 
Fellowship Incentives 8.98 
SD 
2.978 
4.264 
3.229 
n 
111 
108 
109 
Next, descriptive statistics were performed on Question 9 of the survey in order to 
examine some ofthe dimensions of the variable action. The mean for percentage of 
action alerts acted upon during the previous twelve months was M = 31.61 (SD = 27.530) 
with the median level of action at 20.0. A frequency analysis also revealed that the range 
varied from 0% to 100% and that the majority of subjects (50.9%, n =54) acted upon 
20% or fewer of the action alerts they had received during the previous twelve months. In 
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fact, nearly 20% ofthe subjects (19.8%, n = 21) acted upon 10% or fewer of the action 
alerts they had received. Very few subjects reported additional tactics. One noteworthy 
one was "help with candidate forum" (Subject 372). 
Hypothesis 1 was initially tested using Pearson's product-moment correlation 
(two-tailed). As Table 4 illustrates, each of the composite measures of incentives was 
correlated with action at a significant level, with the strongest correlation between 
strategic incentives and action (r = .356,p < .01), followed by fellowship and action (r = 
.305,p < .01) and resource development and action (r = .248,p < .05). 
Table 4 
Correlations Between Incentives to Join Coalitions and Action 
Variables 1 
1. Action 
2. Strategic Incentives .356** 
3. Resource Development Incentives .248* 
4. Fellowship Incentives .305** 
2 
.356** 
.293** 
.457** 
3 
.248* 
.293** 
.483** 
Note. Data examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
4 
.305** 
.457** 
.483** 
Additionally, each of the incentives was significantly correlated with each of the others. 
In particular, fellowship incentives were strongly correlated with both strategic incentives 
(r = .457,p < .01) and resource development incentives (r = .483,p < .01). Hypothesis 1 
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was also examined using a stepwise regression analysis. As shown in Table 5, this 
method revealed that the best equation for prediction of variance in action would include 
strategic incentives and fellowship incentives, while excluding resource development 
incentives (r2 = .173 ). The findings from the regression analysis made clear that the 
incentives were separate dimensions statistically even though the incentives were highly 
correlated with each other. Taken together with the Pearson's analysis of the relationship 
between incentives and action, the evidence supported hypothesis 1: The number of 
action alerts that coalition members responded to correlated with the incentives that 
motivated them to join the coalition. 
Table 5 
Stepwise Regression Analysis of Incentives to Join Coalitions 
Independent Variables 
Step 1 a 
Strategic Incentives 
Step 2b 
Strategic Incentives 
Fellowship Incentives 
Note. Dependent variable is action. 
aR2 for step 1 = .133; br2 for step 2 = .173. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
B SEB 
3.371 .889 
2.398 .984 
1.859 .870 
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.364** 
.259* 
.227* 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the number of action alerts that coalition members 
respond to correlates with their role in the coalition. Results from Question 3 of the 
survey revealed that the vast majority of subjects characterized their role as peripheral 
(75%, n = 63), whereas core members constituted 16% ofthe subjects (n = 19) and 21% 
of the subjects reported their role as partner (n = 25). Table 6 begins the examination of 
the relationship between role and action by showing that core members had the highest 
mean of action (M= 37.50, SD = 28.460) and peripheral members had the lowest (M= 
28.37, SD = 27.573). Interestingly, though, core members and partners had nearly the 
same means for action. However, a one-way ANOV A analysis found no statistical 
difference in action between core, partner, and peripheral groups, df = 2, F = 1.327, p = 
.270. 
Table 6 
Summary of Coalition Roles and Mean Scores for Action 
Role 
Core 
Partner 
Peripheral 
M 
37.50 
37.36 
28.37 
SD 
28.460 
26.269 
27.573 
n 
16 
22 
68 
Next, action was recoded from an interval variable to an ordinal variable in order 
to test hypothesis 2 using crosstabulations and chi-square. Table 7 shows that the 
majority of subjects reported less than 50% action regardless of role. Moreover, the chi-
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square tests were not significant, X2(2, n = 1 06), p = .536. Taken together with the 
AN OVA analysis, the data did not support hypothesis 2: the number of action alerts that 
coalition members responded to was not correlated with role in the coalition. 
Table 7 
Crosstabulation of Coalition Roles and Action 
Core(%) 
Action< 50% 
Action>= 50% 
Total 
Hypothesis 3 
9 (56.3) 
7 (43.8) 
(100%) 
Partner(%) 
12 (54.5) 
10(45.5) 
(100%) 
Peripheral (%) 
45 (66.2) 
23 (33.8) 
(100%) 
Hypothesis 3 stated that coalition members who have advocacy as part oftheir 
official duties will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than 
members who do not have advocacy as part of their official duties. Responses to 
Question 13 of the survey revealed that more than two thirds of the subjects (69.8%, n = 
81) reported that advocacy was part of their job description, whereas about one third of 
the subjects (30.2%, n = 35) indicated that advocacy was not part of their job description. 
As predicted, subjects with advocacy included as part of their official duties had a greater 
mean for action (M = 34.53, SD = 26.650) than subjects who did not have advocacy 
included among their official duties (M = 24.06, SD = 26.480). However, a two-sample t-
test for independent samples failed to confirm a significant difference in action between 
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these two groups, t (103) = 1.790,p = .076, n = 105 (two-tailed). Given this evidence, the 
data supported hypothesis 3 as a description of the sample, but not inferentially for the 
underlying population: advocacy as an official duty was not related to the number of 
action alerts coalition members responded to. 
Hypothesis 4 
According to hypothesis 4, managers will respond to a significantly greater 
number of action alerts than direct -service providers. Results from Question 12 of the 
survey showed that the great majority of subjects indicated their primary job function as 
management 71.3% (n = 82), whereas 17.4% (n = 20) indicated their job function as 
service providers and 11.3% (n = 13) reported other. It should be noted that three 
responses in the category other were recoded into service provider because of the nature 
ofthe description provided by the subject (e.g., "teacher"). Contrary to the prediction, 
service providers had a higher mean for action (M = 37.21, SD = 31.699) than managers 
(M = 32.82, SD = 27 .177). However, a two-sample t-test for independent samples failed 
to confirm a significant difference between these two groups, t (88) = .542, p = .589, n = 
90 (two-tailed). Overall, the data did not support hypothesis 4: job function was not 
related to the number of action alerts coalition members responded to. 
Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that coalition members from larger organizations would 
respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members from smaller 
organizations. Results from Question 14 of the survey revealed the mean and median for 
the number of paid staff(M= 69.75, SD = 150.138, MDN= 25.00). It should be noted 
that a small number of organizations had a much larger paid staff than the more typical 
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organization in the study. In fact, while 95% of the subjects' organizations (n = 113) had 
staff sizes of fewer than 300 employees, one organization was reported to have 1400 
employees. Additionally, Table 8 illustrates that the majority of subjects (56.8%, n = 67) 
reported in response to Question 15 of the survey that their organization's budget size 
was more than $1 million. An examination using Pearson's product-moment correlation 
found no significant correlation between staff size and action, r = .159, p = .1 03, n = 106 
(two-tailed). 
Next, a crosstabulation of budget size and action was performed. For this test, 
budget size was recoded into either less than, or equal to, or greater than $1 million. 
Table 9 shows that the majority of subjects reported that they responded to 50% or fewer 
action alerts regardless of their organization's budget size. In fact, a chi-square analysis 
did not find a significant difference between these groups, X2(1, n = 1 05) = 3.278, p = 
.070. Overall, the evidence did not support hypothesis 5. 
Table 8 
Summary of Reported Budget Sizes 
Budget Size % n 
Less than $100,000 2.5 3 
$101,000 to $500,000 22.9 27 
$500,000 to $1 million 17.8 21 
More than $1 million 56.8 67 
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Table 9 
Cross tabulation of Budget Size and Action 
<=$1 million (%) 
Action< 50% 
Action>= 50% 
Total 
34 (72.3) 
13 (27.7) 
(100%) 
Budget 
Results of Exploratory Elements 
Exploratory Question I 
>$1 million(%) 
32 (55.2) 
26 (44.8) 
(100%) 
Exploratory question 1 investigated how, if at all, incentives shifted over time. 
Table 10 highlighted key data from Question 6 of the survey, which asked the subjects to 
report what reasons motivated them to remain members of the advocacy coalition they 
selected in Question 1. This table shows that more than 50% of subjects (52.6%, n = 60) 
indicated that bringing about social change to benefit others had a significant influence 
on their decision to remain a member, whereas nearly one third of subjects (32.1 %, n = 
35) reported that the aim of generating revenue for their organization had no influence on 
their decision to remain. When compared to the reasons to join advocacy coalitions set 
out in Table 2, it appears that the reasons to join were quite similar to the reasons to 
remain; all six of the reasons listed in each table are the same, appearing in nearly 
identical order with, for the most part, only modest changes in percentages. 
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Table 10 
Most and Least Influential Reasons to Remain in Coalitions 
Reasons % 
Most Frequent Significant Influencea 
Bring about social change to benefit others 
Achieve broad goals 
Network with colleagues 
52.6 
33.3 
34.8 
Most Frequent No Influenceb 
Generate revenue for your organization 
Maximize flow of money to your organization 
Develop new friendships 
32.1 
28.7 
23.6 
n 
60 
38 
39 
35 
31 
26 
aSignificant influence equals score of 4 on survey; bno influence equals score of 0. 
Next, Question 7 of the survey provided subjects with an opportunity to describe 
other reasons that motivated them to remain members of the advocacy coalition. The 
comments on this question paralleled the responses to Question 5. Information was by far 
the most frequently cited reason (n = 15) followed by the quality of the advocacy 
coalition or its staff (n = 4). Additional comments included "loyalty to the organization" 
(Subject 59) and "assigned by my agency" (Subject 140). Finally, Subject 341 wrote, "As 
an early childhood education provider it is a part of my professionalism to be an advocate 
for families and their children so I have to remain in the organization so as not to go 
against one of the norms of my profession." 
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Next, means for the composite measures of incentives to remain were calculated. 
As Table 11 illustrates, strategic incentives had the highest mean at M = 10.60 (SD = 
3 .282), while resource development incentives had the lowest mean at M == 7.5 8 (SD = 
3.749). These results were strikingly similar to the results for incentives to join in Table 
3; each of the incentives held to the same position relative to other incentives. 
Table 11 
Means of Incentives to Remain in Coalitions 
Composite Measures M SD n 
Strategic Incentives 10.60 3.282 107 
Resource Development Incentives 7.58 4.318 106 
Fellowship Incentives 8.96 3.749 106 
To peer further into exploratory question 1, a Pearson's product-moment 
correlation amongst the incentives was conducted (two-tailed). The results illustrated in 
Table 12 indicate that the incentives reported for joining advocacy coalitions were 
significantly correlated (p < .01) with their corresponding incentives for remaining. In 
fact, the correlation for resource development had a very strong correlation (r = .903), 
followed by fellowship incentives (r = .787) and strategic incentives (r = .728). Further, 
with the exception of the correlation between strategic incentives to join with resource 
development incentives to remain, all of the inter-correlations among the various pairs of 
incentives were highly significant. 
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Table 12 
Correlations Between Incentives to Join and Incentives to Remain in Coalitions 
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
Incentives to Join 
1. Strategic .293** .457** .728** .144 .461 ** 
2. Resource Develop .. 293** .483** .379** .903** .434** 
3. Fellowship .457** .483** .463** .396** .787** 
Incentives to Remain 
4. Strategic .728** .379** .463** .392** .666** 
5. Resource Develop .. 144 .903** .396** .392** .448** 
6. Fellowship .461 ** .434** .787** .666** .448** 
Note. Data examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed). 
**p < .01. 
These findings demonstrated that strong predictions could be made from joining 
to remaining and among the numerous pairs of incentives. However, an examination of 
the extent ofthe shift from joining to remaining was still needed to explore this question 
fully. A paired sample t-test (two-tailed) accomplished this task. As Table 13 shows, only 
resource development incentives significantly changed. In fact, resource development 
incentives increased from a mean of 7.10 (SD = 4.225) as an incentive to join advocacy 
coalitions to a mean of7.63 as an incentive to remain (SD = 4.379). Recognizing that 
length of time as a member might impact the shift in incentives, an additional paired 
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sample t-test (two-tailed) was conducted on only those subjects who reported in Question 
2 of the survey that their length of membership in the advocacy coalition was about one 
to three years or more than three years. These results were nearly identical to the results 
of the first paired sample t-test. For instance, material incentives significantly increased 
as a motivation to join advocacy coalitions (M = 7 .24, SD = 4.364) when compared with 
their strength as an incentive to remain (M= 7.79, SD = 4.462). 
Table 13 
Paired Sample T-tests of Incentives to Join Coalitions to Incentives to Remain in 
Coalitions 
Incentives M SD df t 
Pair 1 
Strategic Join 10.61 2.847 105 .084 
Strategic Remain 10.59 3.297 
Pair 2 
Resource Join 7.10 4.225 100 -2.827** 
Resource Remain 7.63 4.379 
Pair 3 
Fellowship Join 9.00 3.289 104 .293 
Fellowship Remain 8.93 3.766 
**p < .01. 
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n 
106 
101 
104 
Exploratory Question 2 
Exploratory question 2 asked, what is the frequency of action alerts received by 
coalition members? Table 14 shows that the portion of subjects (37.9%, n = 44) received 
action alerts once per month or less as indicated in Question 8 of the survey. 
Additionally, crosstabulations revealed that the majority of subjects ( 62.9%, n = 73) acted 
upon 33% or fewer of the action alerts regardless of the frequency of receiving them. 
Table 14 
Summary of Frequency of Receiving Action Alerts 
Group % n 
Once per month or less 37.9 44 
Two times per month 25.0 29 
Three times per month 12.1 14 
Four or more times per month 21.6 25 
Exploratory Question 3 
Table 15 reveals some of the key similarities and differences between the 
advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics conducted by 
coalition members during the twelve months prior to the study. For example, endorsing 
circular letters or petitions had the highest frequency for a tactic requested and conducted 
at least once during the previous twelve months, while faxing elected officials had the 
highest frequency for a tactic that was requested but was not conducted at least once; 
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filing suit or engaging in other legal action had the highest frequency for a tactic that was 
never requested. 
Table 15 
Advocacy Tactics Most Frequently Requested and Conducted, Most Frequently 
Requested and Not Conducted, and Most Frequently Not Requested 
Advocacy Tactics % 
Most Frequently Requested and Conducted 
Endorse circular letters or petitions 
Participate in rallies or demonstrations 
Email elected officials 
Distribute literature about public policy issues 
64.1 
62.9 
61.9 
60.8 
Most Frequently Requested and Not Conducted 
Fax elected officials 
Phone elected officials 
Submit letters to the editor or op-ed pieces 
38.6 
37.3 
33.3 
Mail government agency directors 32.7 
Most Frequently Not Requested 
File suit or engage in other legal action 
Conduct voter registration drive 
Conduct research or data collection 
Submit letters to the editor or op-ed pieces 
57 
87.3 
74.5 
64.7 
55.6 
n 
66 
66 
65 
62 
39 
38 
33 
32 
89 
76 
66 
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The data also showed that email was the most frequently conducted tactical means 
of contacting elected officials or government agency directors. However, elected officials 
were contacted by email at twice the rate applying to agency directors (61.9%, n = 65; 
27.9%, n = 29, respectively). This distinction between elected officials and agency 
directors was repeated for mail, fax, and phone contact. Further, while more than one 
third of the subjects (39.6%, n = 40) reported having testified at a public hearing at least 
once during the previous twelve months, about the same number of subjects (n = 41) had 
never been asked to testify. Finally, the results showed that more than 50% (58.7%, n = 
61) of subjects had mobilized their clients for advocacy at least once during the previous 
twelve months. 
Exploratory Question 4 
Exploratory question 4 sought to uncover the relationships among core, partner, 
and peripheral roles in advocacy coalitions and each of the strategic, resource 
development, and fellowship incentives for joining and remaining. To examine these 
relationships, incentives were recoded from an interval variable to an ordinal variable and 
then crosstabulations and chi-square analyses were performed. The only significant 
findings were discovered in the relationships between role and strategic incentives for 
joining advocacy coalitions. As Table 16 shows, strategic incentives had at least a minor 
influence on all of the subjects' decisions to join advocacy coalitions, regardless of role. 
However, strategic incentives had a strong influence on all ofthe core members (n = 18) 
and nearly all of the partner members (n = 20), whereas, in contrast, one third of the 
peripheral members reported that strategic incentives were only a minor or moderate 
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influence on their decision. As mentioned, the chi-square test was significant, X2(2, n = 
110) = 10.596,p = .005. 
Table 16 
Cross tabulation of Role and Strategic Incentives to Join Coalitions 
Influence of Strategic Incentives 
Role No\%) Minor/Moderate\%) Strong/Significantc (%) 
Core 0 (0) 0 (0) 18(21.4) 
Partner 0 (0) 3 (11.5) 20 (23.8) 
Peripheral 0 (0) 23 (88.5) 46 (54.8) 
Total (0%) (100%) (100%) 
~o score equals 0; bminor/moderate score equals 1 through 8; cstrong/significant score 
equals 9 through 16. 
Exploratory Question 5 
This question sought to uncover the relationship between advocacy as an official 
duty and incentives. Using a series of two-sample t-tests for independent samples (two-
tailed), Table 17 shows that significant differences were found only in fellowship 
incentives to remain members of advocacy coalitions where the mean for those subjects 
who reported that advocacy was not part of their job description was higher (M = 1 0.34, 
SD = 3.062) than those subjects who reported advocacy was part of their job description 
(M = 8.36, SD = 3.843). 
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Table 17 
Independent Samples T-tests of Advocacy as an Official Duty to Incentives 
Incentives Advocacy in M(n) SD df t 
job description? 
Incentives to Join 
Yes 10.53 (78) 2.691 106 .732 
Strategic 
No 10.00 (30) 3.562 
Yes 6.93 (75) 4.260 103 -.361 
Resource 
No 7.27 (30) 
Yes 8.78 (76) 3.393 104 -.980 
Fellowship 
No 9.47 (30) 2.921 
Incentives to Remain 
Yes 10.33 (76) 3.296 102 -.831 
Strategic 
No 10.93 (28) 3.173 
Yes 7.25 (75) 4.439 102 -1.223 
Resource 
No 8.41 (29) 4.067 
Yes 8.36 (76) 3.843 103 -2.499* 
Fellowship 
No 10.34 (26) 3.062 
*p < .05. 
Exploratory Question 6 
This exploratory question examined the association between primary job function 
and incentives, once again using a series of two-sample t-tests for independent samples 
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(two-tailed). As Table 18 illustrates, no significant differences were found between 
service providers and managers in their incentives to join advocacy coalitions or their 
incentives to remain. 
Table 18 
Independent Samples T-tests of Primary Job Function to Incentives 
Incentives Job Function M(n) SD df t 
Incentives to Join 
Management 11.21 (19) 2.992 95 1.170 
Strategic 
Service 10.33 (78) 2.917 
Management 6.00 (18) 3.199 91 -1.702 
Resource 
Service 7.55 (75) 4.391 
Management 9.35 (17) 2.621 92 .575 
Fellowship 
Service 8.84 (77) 3.426 
Incentives to Remain 
Management 10.88 (17) 3.740 92 .353 
Strategic 
Service 10.58 (77) 3.015 
Management 6.38 (16) 3.998 91 -1.344 
Resource 
Service 7.96 (77) 4.351 
Management 9.47 (17) 3.502 92 .708 
Fellowship 
Service 8.75 (77) 3.839 
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Exploratory Question 7 
Exploratory question 7 investigated the relationship between organizational size 
and incentives. This was first accomplished through a series of Pearson's product-
moment correlations. As Table 19 shows, no significant correlations were found between 
staff size and either incentives to join advocacy coalitions or incentives to remain (two-
tailed). 
Table 19 
Correlations Between Staff Size and Incentives 
Variables 
Incentives to Join 
Strategic 
Resource Development 
Fellowship 
Incentives to Remain 
Strategic 
Resource Development 
Fellowship 
Number of 
Paid Staff(n) 
-.093 (110) 
-.107 (108) 
-.058 (109) 
-.034 (106) 
-.087 (106) 
-.002 (107) 
Note. Data examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed); n =per-
cell sample size. 
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Additionally, in order to conduct a second set of Pearson's correlation 
coefficients, budget size was recoded from an ordinal variable to interval variable using 
the midpoints of the ordinal scale. As shown in Table 20, like staff size, no significant 
findings were found in the correlations between budget size and incentives (two-tailed). 
Table 20 
Correlations Between Budget Size and Incentives 
Variables 
Incentives to Join 
Strategic 
Resource Development 
Fellowship 
Incentives to Remain 
Strategic 
Resource Development 
Fellowship 
Budget Size 
Interval (n) 
.022 (110) 
.043 (106) 
.013 (107) 
.130 (106) 
.084 (106) 
.051 (106) 
Note. Budget size recoded from an ordinal variable to an interval variable using the 
midpoints of the ordinal scale; data examined using Pearson's product-moment 
correlation (two-tailed); n =per-ceil sample size. 
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Exploratory Question 8 
This exploratory question was formulated on the prediction that the factors of 
incentives, job function, official duty, and organizational size would each have a 
significant relationship to action. However, since only incentives were found to have a 
significant relationship with action, the path analysis model was not conducted as 
planned. Rather, it will be the charge of future research to include multiple factors in an 
examination of their relationship to action. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter reviews the problem, summarizes the findings, discusses the 
important results, offers implications for the existing literature and organizational 
practices, recommends improvements to this study, and suggests avenues for further 
research. 
Review of the Problem 
America needs to muster significant resources to ensure that children remain safe, 
live healthy lives, and succeed in school. America's children are undoubtedly 
underrepresented in the democratic process, and public policy advocacy on their behalf is 
urgently needed to meet the needs of one of our nation's most dependent and vulnerable 
populations. Among the important resources available to conduct advocacy on behalf of 
children are the service providers that children encounter in public charities such as 
human and social service agencies, hospitals, and educational organizations. Some of 
these service providers are already engaged in advocacy through a network of advocacy 
coalitions. These individuals have combined in order to collectively influence public 
policy. Yet the success of advocacy coalitions is fundamentally dependent on their 
members heeding the call to action, that is to say, acting upon alert messages that urge 
advocacy. Without action, advocacy coalitions cannot effect changes in public policy. 
While a number of factors likely influence the responsiveness of coalition members to 
calls to action, this project examined a central factor in all behavior: the motives behind 
it. 
There is an immense amount of complexity and variability in the motives that 
drive people and groups. Behavior is derived from a wide range of motives generated 
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from both personal and organizational forces, such as needs for moral fulfillment, 
altruistic drives, interpersonal relations, and material gains, to name a few. Additionally, 
not all motives are universal and, equally importantly, different motives appear to impact 
behavior differently. But what do individual motives and organizational factors have to 
do with individuals from public charities joining and participating in child-focused 
advocacy coalitions? To add to the understanding of this important subject, this study 
tested five hypotheses and explored seven additional questions in order to enhance the 
understanding of motivation and its role in advocacy coalitions. Why do individuals from 
public charities join child-focused advocacy coalitions? Is there an association between 
reasons for joining advocacy coalitions and the frequency of heeding the calls to action? 
How do other factors, such as role in the coalition, job function, advocacy as an official 
duty, and organizational size, impact coalition members heeding the call to action? 
Summary of Results 
Surveys were mailed to 400 members of child-focused advocacy coalitions in 
California. Responses were received from 120 subjects, yielding a final valid response 
rate of 36.8%, with the largest portion of subjects having been members of Coalition D. 
Explanatory Elements 
Several significant results were revealed with regards to hypothesis 1. First, the 
hypothesis was supported: the number of action alerts that coalition members responded 
to was correlated with the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition. Strategic 
incentives had the strongest positive correlation, followed by fellowship incentives and 
resource development incentives. A combination of strategic and fellowship incentives 
served as a significant predictor of up to 17.3% of the variance in action. An examination 
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of the results showed that two of the top three "most significantly influencing" reasons to 
join advocacy coalitions were tied to strategic incentives, whereas two of the top three 
"non-influential items" were tied to resource development incentives. Overall, a picture 
emerged showing that strategic incentives were the most influential incentives to join 
advocacy coalitions, with the largest positive correlation with action. By contrast, 
resource development incentives were the least influential incentives to join advocacy 
coalitions, with the smallest positive correlation with action. Fellowship incentives fell in 
between strategic and resource development incentives for both influence to join and 
correlation with action. 
Still other significant findings emerged from the testing of hypothesis 1. For 
instance, there were significant positive correlations among the various pairs of 
incentives. The results revealed that strategic, fellowship, and resource development 
incentives were all significantly and positively correlated with each other. Finally, the 
data showed that the mean level of action was about 33%, with the majority of subjects 
having acted upon one fifth or fewer of the action alerts they had received during the 
previous twelve months. The results, however, were not statistically significant for the 
remaining hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5 were not supported by the data. For hypothesis 2, core 
and partner members had higher means for action in the sample than peripheral members, 
but no statistically significant difference was detected. Since three fourths of the subjects 
were peripheral members, the small sample size of the core and partner members may 
have inhibited detection of a statistical difference in action between the groups. It should 
also be noted that since a large portion of the subjects identified themselves as peripheral 
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members, this might have skewed the findings throughout the study towards these self-
identified outermost participants of the advocacy coalitions. Next, for hypothesis 3, no 
significant difference in action was detected between those subjects reporting that 
advocacy was part of their job description compared to those subjects reporting that 
advocacy was not part oftheir job description. Since more than two thirds of the subjects 
reported that advocacy was part of their job description, the small sample size for 
comparison may have inhibited detection of a significant difference. 
Interestingly, for hypothesis 4, the results ran contrary to the prediction: subjects 
who reported their job function as service to clients had a higher, not lower, mean for 
action than managers. However, further statistical analysis failed to reveal a significant 
difference. Because more than four times as many subjects were managers as compared 
to service staff, the small sample size for service staff may have precluded detection of a 
significant difference in action. Finally, the examination of hypothesis 5 found no 
relationship between organizational size and action. No correlation was found between 
staff size and action, nor were differences in action revealed between the various budget 
sizes. With regards to budget size, because the majority of subjects reported their 
organization's budget as more than $1 million, actual differences could have been 
obscured by the imprecise nature of the top-heavy data in ordinal scale for budget. 
It should be underscored that since the results supported hypothesis 1, there is 
probably a relationship between incentives and action in the population under 
examination. However, the fact the results failed to support hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5 does 
not mean that no differences exist in action with regards to role, official duty, job 
function, or organizational size. While individuals within each of these groups may have 
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heeded similar percentages of calls to action during the previous twelve months, 
differences may appear on other dimensions of action such as types of advocacy activity 
undertaken. Additional research is warranted to confirm the null hypothesis of the 
unsubstantiated predictions. 
Exploratory Elements 
The data revealed a number of significant findings during the examination of 
exploratory question 1. First, the results showed that the relative influence of strategic, 
fellowship, and resource development incentives on subjects' decisions to remain 
members of advocacy coalitions was the same as on their decision to join: strategic 
incentives were most influential, followed by fellowship and then resource development 
incentives. Additionally, the incentives to remain members were strongly correlated with 
the incentives to join; as incentives to join increased, there tended to be a corresponding 
increase in incentives to remain. However, a significant shift from joining to remaining 
appeared only in resource development incentives. The mean for resource development 
incentives to remain was significantly higher than the mean for resource development 
incentives to join. In fact, with regards to strategic and fellowship incentives, there was 
essentially no meaningful shift at all. 
Next, exploratory questions 2 and 3 inquired into action alerts. The data revealed 
that most subjects received action alerts once per month or less. The results also showed 
that most subjects acted upon 33% or fewer ofthe action alerts, regardless of the 
frequency of receiving them. Endorsing letters or circular petitions and participating in 
rallies were the two most frequently requested and conducted advocacy tactics. Email 
was the most frequently conducted means of contacting elected officials and government 
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agency directors. Elected officials were contacted at twice the rate of agency directors. 
Finally, while the data revealed that the majority of subjects had mobilized their clients 
for advocacy at least once during the previous twelve months and that more than one 
third of the subjects reported having testified at a public hearing, various other advocacy 
tactics - for example, legal action, voter registration, and undertaking research - had 
yet to be requested by advocacy coalitions to any meaningful degree. 
The investigation of exploratory question 4 showed that strategic incentives 
played a part in all of the subjects' decisions to join advocacy coalitions, regardless of 
their role. Moreover, all of the core members reported that strategic incentives played a 
strong influence on their decision to join. Next, regarding exploratory question 5, the 
results demonstrated that fellowship incentives played a significantly greater part in the 
decision to remain members of advocacy coalitions for those subjects who did not have 
advocacy in their job description than it did for those subjects who did have advocacy in 
their job description. 
Finally, no significant findings were discovered with regards to exploratory 
question 6 or exploratory question 7. The data did not reveal any relationship between 
incentives and job function, nor did the results show any relationship between 
organizational size and incentives. 
Discussion of Important Results 
Incentives and Action 
This research sought to understand why individuals from public charities joined 
child-focused advocacy coalitions and to identify factors that influenced responses to the 
call to action. Motivations were revealed and important factors were identified. This 
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study discovered that the incentives to join advocacy coalitions were positively correlated 
with the number of calls to action that members of advocacy coalitions responded to. As 
the influence of the incentives to join increased, there tended to be corresponding 
increases in action. This evidence validates motivation theory: variations in behavior can 
be explained, at least in part, by motivation. In this study, subjects tended to work harder 
-that is, respond to more action alerts- as their incentives to join advocacy coalitions 
increased. This is an important finding. But as the results of this study revealed, not all 
incentives were equally influential. 
This study discovered that strategic incentives were the most influential 
incentives. By and large, coalition members joined advocacy coalitions to bring about 
social change to benefit others, to express important personal values, to achieve broad 
goals, and to provide altruistic service for others. In fact, the evidence showed that core 
members of the coalitions were motivated especially by strategic incentives. Resource 
development incentives were the least influential incentives. Opportunities to advance 
their organization, to protest cuts in funding to their organization, to generate revenue for 
their organization, or to maximize the flow of money to their organization played a small 
role, at best, in decisions to join advocacy coalitions. Moreover, not only did strategic 
incentives play the most significant role in decisions to join advocacy coalitions, but 
these incentives also correlated most closely with levels of response to action alerts. As 
the influence of strategic incentives grew, there tended to be larger corresponding 
increases in action as compared to equivalent increases in the influence of resource 
development incentives. The contrast is readily apparent. Coalition members primarily 
joined to serve, benefit, and achieve broad goals for others; they were not motivated by 
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material gains for their organizations. In effect, it appears that strategic incentives served 
as the core influence on coalition members. Equally importantly, the motivation to serve 
and benefit others was associated comparatively strongly with action. These too are 
important discoveries. 
However, the study also revealed that incentives to join advocacy coalitions do 
not operate in isolation from one another. For instance, while strategic incentives were 
the most influential incentives, they did not serve, when taken in isolation, as the firmest 
basis for prediction. Rather, the largest amount of variance in action could be accounted 
for by simultaneously observing the level of influence ofboth strategic and fellowship 
incentives. Furthermore, the results showed that as the influence of one set of incentives 
grew, there tended to be corresponding increases in the other incentives as well. This was 
particularly true in the case of fellowship incentives. As the influence of either strategic 
or resource development incentives grew, there tended to be a relatively large 
corresponding increase in fellowship incentives. It appears that as the influence of 
motivations to serve and benefit others or to enhance material gains grows, so does the 
need to do so among like-minded individuals. Overall, the evidence showed significant 
relationships amongst the incentives to join advocacy coalitions. But such 
interrelationships were not limited to incentives to join. 
The results revealed that the incentives to join advocacy coalitions were 
significantly correlated with the incentives to remain. As the influence of incentives to 
join grew, there tended to be corresponding increases in the incentives to remain. This 
was the case for each of the pairs of incentives: strategic incentives to join correlated 
strongly with strategic incentives to remain, and so forth. In fact, the correlation between 
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resource development incentives to join and to remain was exceptionally strong. While 
these findings showed that the motivation level for joining advocacy coalitions was 
significantly related to the motivation level to remain, other, related evidence revealed the 
extent to which incentives shifted from joining to remaining. The study found that there 
were no significant changes from joining to remaining for either strategic or fellowship 
incentives. It was as if the level of influence of these incentives at joining continued to be 
the ongoing level of influence. In contrast, however, the results showed a significant shift 
in resource development incentives. The level of influence of resource development 
incentives was significantly stronger for remaining with advocacy coalitions than for 
joining them. It appears that something special was happening to bring about an increase 
over time in the strength of resource development incentives. Perhaps coalition members 
saw that material rewards were to be gained from their participation in coalition activities 
and they increasingly staked a claim on financially beneficial outcomes of action. 
However, even the increased influence of resource development incentives still did not 
meet the strength of fellowship or strategic incentives. They grew, but they did not 
surpass the influence of the other incentives. 
The study found a significant relationship between incentives and official duty. 
Fellowship incentives to remain members of advocacy coalitions were more influential 
among those members who did not have advocacy in their job description as compared to 
those members who did. It was as if those members without advocacy in their job 
description had a found a community of like-minded individuals with whom to network 
and associate. The evidence showed that these members were willing to expand their 
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official role beyond service provision, and in doing so the sense of fellowship strongly 
influenced their decision to remain with the coalition. 
Advocacy Tactics and Action 
One exploratory question of this study was to assess the similarities and 
differences between advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics 
conducted by coalition members. The study revealed several important results in this line 
of inquiry. First, the evidence implied there were "tried and true" tactics in place in 
advocacy coalitions. Tactics such as endorsing circular letters, participating in rallies, and 
emailing elected officials stood out as frequently requested and frequently conducted 
tactics. However, while some tactics were requested and conducted far less frequently, 
the results showed that, broadly speaking, specific tactics were requested, but not 
conducted, about one third of the time. No single tactic stood as the one tactic few 
members conducted. Conversely, several tactics stood out as very infrequently requested, 
including legal action, voter registration, and research. The evidence showed that 
coalition members were much more engaged with elected officials than with government 
agency directors. This may suggest that advocacy coalitions form to engage elected 
officials on behalf of children. In fact, the focus on elected officials matches well with the 
strong influence of strategic incentives. Coalition members joined to achieve broad goals 
and, as such, directed their attention towards these crafters of broad policy goals. By 
contrast, the findings suggested that engagement with government agency directors was 
being handled elsewhere, perhaps at the group level with individual public charities 
rather than at the coalition level. Additionally, while this study's charity workers heeded 
the call to action on behalf of others, it was encouraging to discover that a majority of the 
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coalition members had mobilized clients to conduct advocacy on their own behalf. 
Finally, the results showed that coalition members responded to about one in three calls 
to action, with a majority of members responding to about one in five calls. 
In summary, this study found that public charity workers joined child-focused 
advocacy coalitions in order to speak and act on behalf of others towards the achievement 
of broad goals. These incentives promoted action more than did opportunities for 
fellowship or for material rewards. Additionally, the study revealed important differences 
in advocacy tactics requested and conducted, most notably that coalition members were 
much more engaged with elected officials than with government agency directors. 
Coalition leaders should use these findings to enhance their ability to attract and retain 
hard-working members. Specific implications of these findings for organizational 
practices will be addressed later in this chapter. 
Implications for Existing Literature 
The results of this study inform the existing literature in a number of valuable 
ways. First of all, it drew attention to under-researched segments of society, in particular, 
child-focused advocacy coalitions. It responded to the call by De Vita et al. (2001) for 
more research on organizations that directed their attention towards children and it added 
to the growing body of knowledge on these important advocates for children. 
The study also added more empirical evidence to the understanding of motivation 
in the context of child-focused advocacy coalitions. For instance, referring to Beck's 
(1983) summary ofthe four basic philosophies of motivation in the workplace, the 
rational/economic viewpoint was not supported by the evidence. Rather, the results 
indicated that motivation is a complex construct with great variability. The findings 
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support Barnard's (1938) argument that non-material incentives are more important than 
material rewards. It appears, as Barnard asserted, that political organizations would not 
be able to survive without the ability to satisfy personal, altruistic ideals, a position 
similarly argued by Berry (1977). In contrast, the study provided evidence counter to 
Clark and Wilson's (1961) claims that for purposive organizations, such as advocacy 
groups, "fewer people are willing to accept organizational purposes than are willing to 
accept material or solidary inducement" (p. 151 ). The results revealed that purposive 
incentives, such as bringing about social change to benefit others and achieving broad 
goals, were far more accepted and influential than material incentives like generating 
revenue or maximizing the flow of money. 
Next, the results furthered Hula's (1999) argument that coalition members' work-
levels are closely correlated with the reasons why the members joined the coalition. 
Indeed, the evidence showed that strategic, fellowship, and material incentives were 
closely correlated with work-level. Additionally, the results supported Hula's assertion 
that the incentives that motivated a group to join a coalition influenced the role the group 
played in the coalition: for example, core members were significantly motivated by 
strategic incentives. Essentially, the findings successfully extended Hula's work in a 
couple of meaningful directions. It appears that Hula's (1999) arguments applied to a 
narrower range of behavior, specifically acting upon action alerts, and his model applied 
to individuals whose primary role lay outside public policy engagement. Lastly, the 
findings enrich the existing literature on advocacy. Previous studies, particularly those 
based on IRS documents, failed to capture many advocacy activities. In contrast, this 
study revealed a number of important facets of such activities. For example, some 
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advocacy activities, such as supporting rallies and endorsing petitions, were far more 
frequently undertaken than activities involving legal action or voter registration. 
Implications for Organizational Practices 
So far, this study has provided evidence for two ofthe main purposes of research: 
explanation and prediction. The results have explained the significance of incentives and 
their relationship to action. For example, it has been shown that strategic incentives were 
the primary incentive to join advocacy coalitions and had the largest positive correlation 
with action. The results also lend themselves to prediction. For example, it has been 
shown that observing the level of influence of both strategic and fellowship incentives 
served as the best predictor of action. However, leaders of advocacy coalitions should 
also use these findings for another main purpose of research: the application of 
knowledge. It was an important goal of this research to support leaders of child-focused 
advocacy coalitions in their efforts to increase organizational capacity and build a 
stronger voice for children. With that goal in mind, certain implications for organizational 
practices at advocacy coalitions follow. 
Because coalition members join for a variety of reasons, leaders of child-focused 
advocacy coalitions ought to pay attention to the motivation of their members when they 
join. In fact, coalition leaders would do well to pay careful attention to the motivations of 
their members, because not all incentives exert equal influence on action. Implementing 
systems to record and assess the incentives that motivated new members to join would 
aid in the endeavor to predict and control the capacity of advocacy coalitions to engage 
policymakers on behalf of children. Assessments of incentives to join could be used to 
ensure strong matches between particular coalition members and particular coalition 
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activities, thus strengthening organizational capacity. For example, if a coalition member 
was strongly motivated by fellowship incentives, perhaps he or she could work on 
fostering networks within the coalition. By managing the fulfillment of coalition 
members' motivations for joining, coalition leaders might build on the incentives most 
likely to fuel action. Furthermore, since the evidence showed that strategic incentives 
served as coalition members' core incentives for action, leaders of advocacy coalitions 
ought to tum their attention towards nurturing these incentives. Implementing systems to 
promote each ofthe coalitions' activities as efforts tied to the achievement ofbroad goals 
for the benefit of others would cultivate these essential motivators for core strength and 
action. In fact, since the evidence showed that members primarily joined the coalition for 
strategic incentives, marketing the coalition as a tool for social change to potential 
members could well facilitate recruitment of similarly motivated members. 
Additionally, leaders of advocacy coalitions would do well to seek out those 
members who are acting outside of their official duties and to provide validation for their 
participation, to introduce them to the social networks and norms, and to aid in the 
fulfillment of their needs for fellowship. Otherwise, these members may retreat from 
public policy engagement. In fact, the nurturing of fellowship incentives, particularly for 
peripheral members, could be used as a tool to build solidarity among coalition members 
with disparate motivations and interests. As suggested, leaders of advocacy coalitions 
should refine their observations and nurture incentives in their attempts to strengthen the 
core and increase action, but they must also recognize the potential limits of members to 
heed the call. As Subject 239 indicated, 
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My org[anization] focuses on health issues. Thus, I can't/won't respond to alerts 
about issues on other topics. Not because we don't care, but to preserve our focus 
and be disciplined with our limited resources. 
Further research is certainly warranted to understand the barriers to action public charities 
face, even with the best of intentions to heed the call. 
The results also suggest that coalition leaders should continue to request that 
members endorse letters and participate in rallies; members tended to perform these 
activities readily when asked. Coalition leaders should also continue to direct advocacy 
activities towards elected officials; members also tended to perform these functions when 
asked. Perhaps practices within coalitions could be developed that build on the strong 
match between strategic incentives for joining and advocacy directed at elected officials 
with the goal of fostering organizational capacity. Coalition leaders might also consider 
directing more advocacy activities towards government agency directors that implement 
public policy. Encouraging more action on this point in the public policy process might 
facilitate an increase in coalition capacity through those members with close working 
relationships with agency directors. Coalition leaders should consider ways to leverage 
such relationships to strengthen the voices of children. Finally, perhaps there is 
opportunity for increased capacity in the less frequently requested tactics like voter 
registration. Experimenting with less frequently requested tactics might uncover untapped 
resources and opportunities for public policy engagement. 
In conclusion, public charity workers are indeed heeding the call to action on 
behalf of children. They are members of advocacy coalitions and they are actively 
engaged in public policy from a broad, altruistic standpoint where personal values and 
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service for others outweigh material rewards. As Subject 304 concluded on the survey, 
"children do not have a voice in our political system and the only way to give (them] 
voice is to join with others who care about them." Hopefully, the results of this study 
will aid in this important endeavor. However, any changes in organizational practices 
certainly warrant consideration of the limited resources at hand and the innumerable 
factors not addressed by this study. With sound planning and thoughtful use of this 
study's findings, the capacity of child-focused advocacy coalitions could be enhanced, 
improving the frequency at which coalition members heed the calls to action, furthering 
public policy engagement, and fostering safe, healthy, successful lives for children. 
Recommendations 
Improvements to this Study 
If this research were to be conducted in the future, several recommendations may 
be set forth: 
1. Since subjects were selected from only four advocacy coalitions, the pool of 
potential subjects was somewhat limited for the random selection process. About 
20% of the randomly selected potential subjects in this study worked in the same 
public charity as other subjects. Involving a larger number of advocacy coalitions 
or selecting only one subject per public charity might enhance the diversity of the 
results. 
2. A larger sample size might improve the ability to detect significant findings, 
particularly with regards to the investigations of role, job function, and official 
duty. 
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3. Survey Questions 4 and 6 could be changed in key ways. First, given that nearly 
20% of the subjects wrote in Question 5 that the desire for information was one of 
their other reasons for joining the advocacy coalition, adding "information" as an 
item on these questions would improve the ability to measure the relative strength 
of that oft-cited motivation. Similarly, it might be useful to amend these questions 
so that subjects could indicate the relative strength of any of the other reasons 
they choose to add. 
4. Survey Question 9 could be clarified to indicate its meaning more precisely. To 
some subjects "acted on" might have included behaviors other than advocacy 
activities. Alternatively, this question could be revised from "acted on" to 
"responded to" to create more alignment between the hypotheses and the 
operationalization of the variable action. 
5. Since many nonprofits workers are volunteers, Question 14 of the survey could be 
changed to include volunteers. 
6. Since most of the subjects indicated that their organizations' budget size was 
more than $1 million, changing Question 15 of the survey to allow for more 
precise responses might more accurately capture the data on budget size. 
Further Research 
Certainly the understanding of motivation and behavior in the context of child-
focused advocacy coalitions is open to further examination. The following avenues for 
research are recommended: 
1. Further research could continue the examination of incentives and their 
relationship with levels of response to action alerts. For example, what practices 
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are coalitions using to strengthen the core and build fellowship? To what extent 
are particular incentives related to conducting particular advocacy tactics? 
2. Further research could examine the relationships between action and role, job 
function, official duty, and organizational size. Do differences in responsiveness 
to calls to action appear on dimensions not examined by this study? Are 
combinations of these factors significantly related to heeding the call to action? 
3. Further research could examine the shift in incentives. For example, a 
longitudinal study might more accurately reveal the influence of incentives over 
time. What is happening that facilitates a shift in resource development incentives 
but not in strategic or fellowship incentives? 
4. Further research could examine the implications of some of the assumptions made 
in this study. For example, how, if at all, does organizational sanction for 
participation in coalitions impact heeding the call to action? What are the 
similarities and differences between personal incentives and organizational 
incentives for coalition members? 
5. Further research could examine barriers and disincentives to action. For example, 
what factors inhibit heeding the call to action? What factors reduce motivation to 
heed the call? How do incentives, barriers, and disincentives play out in the 
decision-making processes of coalition members? 
6. Further research could examine less formalized child-focused advocacy 
coalitions. Do this study's findings hold true for coalitions without separate staff, 
offices, or identities from their members or coalitions formed under temporary or 
ad hoc arrangements? 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Survey of California Nonprofit Organizations 
Thank you for completing this brief survey. Your answers will be kept confidential. 
Part 1: This section is about your membership in groups. 
1. Which of the following groups are you a member of? For purposes of this study, "member" is 
defined as being on the group's contact list. Check ALL that apply. 
1:1 
1:1 
1:1 
1:1 [Coalition D] 
1:1 None of the above 
If you selected only one group, skip to question 2, otherwise continue with question l.a. If you selected 
none of the above, please return the questionnaire. 
l.a. If you selected more than one group above, please answer the remainder of the survey with 
reference to the group you consider yourself most active with during the last twelve months. 
Please indicate below which one group you've selected to consider when completing the remainder of 
the survey. Check only ONE. 
1:1 
1:1 
1:1 
1:1 [Coalition D] 
PLEASE ANSWER THE REMAINING QUESTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO THE GROUP 
WITH WHICH YOU ARE MOST ACTIVE. 
2. How long have you been a member of the group you selected in question 1? Check only ONE. 
1:1 Less than six months 
1:1 About six months to one year 
1:1 About one to three years 
1:1 More than three years 
3. Which of the following words best characterizes your role in the group you selected in 
question 1? Check only ONE. 
1:1 Core member 
1:1 Partner 
1:1 Peripheral 
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4. In the scale below, indicate what reasons initially motivated you to JOIN the group you 
selected in question I. In this scale, "Q" means not a reason in your decision to become a member; 
"l" means a minor influence on your decision; and ":!" means a significant influence on your 
decision. 
Level of Influence 
Reasons for JOINING Circle ONE number Qer reason 
Not at all Minor lllo Significant 
Bring about social change to benefit others 0 2 3 4 
Advance your organization 0 2 3 4 
Associate with like-minded individuals 0 2 3 4 
Express important personal values 0 2 3 4 
Protest cuts in funding to your organization 0 2 3 4 
Network with colleagues 0 2 3 4 
Achieve broad goals 0 2 3 4 
Generate revenue for your organization 0 2 3 4 
Obtain mutual support in personal attitudes 0 2 3 4 
Provide altruistic service for others 0 2 3 4 
Maximize flow of money to your organization 0 2 3 4 
Develop new friendships 0 2 3 4 
5. In the space below, describe what other reasons motivated you to JOIN the group you selected 
in question 1? If none, write none. 
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6. In the scale below, indicate what reasons currently motivate you to REMAIN a member of the 
group you selected in question 1. In this scale, "Q" means not a reason in your decision to remain 
a member; "1" means a minor influence on your decision; and":!" means a significant influence 
on your decision. 
Level of Influence 
Reasons for REMAINING Circle ONE number 12er reason 
Not at all Minor Significant 
Bring about social change to others 0 2 3 4 
Advance your organization 0 2 3 4 
Associate with like-minded individuals 0 2 3 4 
Express important personal values 0 2 3 4 
Protest cuts in funding to your organization 0 2 3 4 
Network with colleagues 0 2 3 4 
Achieve broad goals 0 2 3 4 
Generate revenue for your organization 0 2 3 4 
Obtain mutual support in personal attitudes 0 2 3 4 
Provide altruistic service for others 0 2 3 4 
Maximize flow of money to your organization 0 2 3 4 
Develop new friendships 0 2 3 4 
7. In the space below, describe what other reasons currently motivate you to REMAIN a member 
of the group you selected in question 1? If none. write none. 
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Part II: This section is about "Action Alerts." "Action Alerts" are defined as messages from the 
group that urge you to conduct advocacy around a particular issue. Action Alerts may have been 
received in any number of ways, including by email, fax, postal mail, phone calls or face-to-face 
communication. 
8. About how many Action Alerts did you receive each month over the last twelve months from 
the group you selected in question 1? Check only ONE. 
0 Once per month or less 
0 Two times per month 
0 Three times per month 
0 Four or more times per month 
0 Never. If never, then skip questions 8 and 9 and proceed to question 10. 
9. Using your best guess, complete the following statement: 
I've acted on _______ % of the total Action Alerts I received during the last 12 
months. 
If zero percent. write 0. 
10. In the question below, indicate by placing an X if the Action Alerts you received from the group 
you selected in question 1 asked you to do the advocacy activity listed anytime during the last 
twelve months AND indicate by placing an X whether or not you did the requested action. Do 
not consider advocacy activities you conduct in addition to those requested by the Action Alerts. 
Activities 
(during last 12 months) 
TestifY at public hearings 
Submit written testimony 
Mobilize clients to conduct advocacy 
Email elected officials 
Mail elected officials 
Fax elected officials 
Phone elected officials 
Meet with elected officials or their staff 
Email government agency directors 
Mail government agency directors 
Fax government agency directors 
Phone government agency directors 
Meet with government agency directors 
Participate in rallies or demonstrations 
Endorse circulating letters or petitions 
Submit letters to the editor or op-ed pieces 
Distribute literature about public policy issues 
File suit or engage in other legal action 
Conduct voter registration drive 
Conduct research or data collection 
Conduct public education campaign 
Other. SpecifY ________ _ 
Other. Specify _________ _ 
Other. Specify ________ _ 
Asked to do Asked to do 
Did at least once Never did 
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Never asked 
to do 
Part III: This section is about your organization. 
11. Are contributions to your organization tax-deductible? Check only ONE. 
0 Yes 
o No --------.1 
ll.a. Which of the following best describes your organization? Check only ONE. 
0 Nonprofit for whom contributions are NOT tax-deductible. 
Describe __________________________________ __ 
0 Local, state or federal agency 
0 For-profit 
0 Other. Describe -----------------------------
12. What is your primary job function? Check only ONE. 
0 Provide services to clients 
0 Management 
o Other. SpecifY __________ _ 
13. As you may know, nonprofit organizations are legally permitted to conduct advocacy. 
Is advocacy part of your job description? Check only ONE. 
0 Yes 
0 No 
14. About how many paid staff (full-time and part-time) members are employed at your 
organization? 
If none, write 0. 
Number of paid staff members 
15. What is your organization's budget for the current year? Check only ONE. 
0 Less than $100,000 
0 $101,000 to $500,000 
0 $501,000 to $1 million 
0 More than $1 million 
Thank you for your time. Please mail back the completed survey in the supplied envelope. Or, mail to: 
Kevin Hickey, 1477 Florida Street San Francisco, CA 94110 
If you have questions, contact Kevin Hickey at 415-336-7123 or khickey@usfca.edu. If you would like 
a copy of the results, write your name and address on the back flap of the return envelope, and the results 
will be sent to you. 
I welcome your additional comments. If you have anything else you would like to say, please write your 
comments on the back of this page. 
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March 15,2004 
Name of Recipient, Title 
Organization 
Address 
City, State Zip Code 
Dear Name of Recipient: 
Appendix B 
Hello, my name is Kevin Hickey. I'm a graduate student in the College of Professional Studies at the 
University of San Francisco (USF), and I also work at a nonprofit agency providing employment 
services to youth with disabilities. For my graduate thesis, I'm conducting a study on public policy 
participation of staff from nonprofit organizations. I'm researching why people, like yourself, may 
have become involved with public policy on behalf of children, youth and their families. This study is 
important because so much of the vital work we do depends on sound public policies. Yet, a great deal 
of knowledge remains to be learned from the motives and activities of people like you. I'm asking you 
to participate in this research study because I believe your unique experiences will add valuable 
insight into the efforts to strengthen the lives of children. 
I was given permission to contact you and your contact information by (name of advocacy group), an 
organization from which you receive information on public policy matters. They have joined me in 
seeking a deeper understanding of the issues that impact the work we do. If you agree to participate in 
this study, please complete the enclosed survey and return the survey to me in the provided pre-
addressed, pre-stamped envelope. This survey will take about ten minutes to complete. To receive a 
copy of the results, simply write your name and address on the back flap of the return envelope. 
Maintaining your confidentiality is important to me. Although you will not be asked to put your name 
on the survey, I will know that you were asked to participate in the study. However, participation may 
mean a loss of confidentiality. In order to safeguard your confidentiality, all records will remain 
permanently confidential, only I will have access to the coded and locked files. Your identity will not 
be revealed in any reports, publications or conversations resulting from the study. Also, your 
individual results will not be revealed to (name of advocacy group), nor will they know precisely who 
was mailed a survey. While there is no direct benefit to you for participating in the study, the 
anticipated benefit of the study is to enhance the understanding of the public policy activities by the 
nonprofit community. 
Participation in this research is voluntary. While it is unlikely, it is possible that some of the survey 
questions may make you feel uncomfortable. You are free to refuse to participate, decline to answer 
any question or withdraw at any point without penalties or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise 
entitled. While (name of organization) is aware of this study, they do not require you to participate. 
There will be no monetary costs to you, nor will you be reimbursed for participating in the study. I ask 
only for your time and effort. If you have questions, I can be reached at 415-336-7123 or 
khickey@usfca.edu. You're also welcome to contact the USF Institutional Review Board for the 
Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at 415-422-6091. 
Thank you very much for your time and attention. I hope you join me in my attempt to gain a greater 
understanding of our important work. Please complete and return the survey today. 
Sincerely, 
Kevin Hickey 
Graduate Student, Master's of Nonprofit Administration, University of San Francisco 
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Appendix C 
Dear <Name of Recipient>: 
I recently mailed you a survey which asks why 
people, like yourself, may have become 
involved in public policy on behalf of 
children. 
If you've not a~ready done 
p~ease comp~ete and return 
survey today. 
Your response will add valuable insight into 
the efforts to strengthen the lives of 
children. 
This survey is undertaken as a requirement 
for my Masters in Nonprofit Administration. 
I appreciate your time and support. 
I£ you cannot:'~\]#.:inth~our survey, 
p~ease contactiine .i;j 415-336-7123 or 
khickey@us£ca.~,,,:, , ' 
Thanks for yo~ p}~pt ~tteljti;~. 
Sincerely, 
Kevin Hickey 
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Recipient 
Organization 
Address 
PLEASE 
PLACE 
STAMP 
City, State Zip 
Appendix D 
REMINDER 
Please complete and return the enclosed survey by Friday, April 9, 2004. 
April 2, 2004 
Name of Recipient, Title 
Organization 
Address 
City, State Zip Code 
Dear N arne of Recipient: 
A few weeks ago you should have received a letter from me, accompanied by a survey. As you may 
recall, I'm a graduate student at the University of San Francisco (USF). For my thesis, I'm conducting 
a study on public policy participation of staff from nonprofit organizations. I'm researching why 
people, like yourself, may have become involved with public policy on behalf of children, youth and 
their families. This study is important because so much of the vital work we do depends on sound 
public policies. Yet, a great deal ofknowledge remains to be learned from the motives and activities 
of people like you. I'm asking you to participate in this research study because I believe your unique 
experiences will add valuable insight into the efforts to strengthen the lives of children. 
I was given permission to contact you and your contact information by (name of advocacy group), an 
organization from which you receive information on public policy matters. They have joined me in 
seeking a deeper understanding of the issues that impact the work we do. If you agree to participate in 
this study, please complete the enclosed survey and return the survey to me in the provided pre-
addressed, pre-stamped envelope. This survey will take about ten minutes to complete. To receive a 
copy of the results, simply write your name and address on the back flap of the return envelope. 
Maintaining your confidentiality is important to me. Although you will not be asked to put your name 
on the survey, I will know that you were asked to participate in the study. However, participation may 
mean a loss of confidentiality. In order to safeguard your confidentiality, all records will remain 
permanently confidential, only I will have access to the coded and locked files. Your identity will not 
be revealed in any reports, publications or conversations resulting from the study. Also, your 
individual results will not be revealed to (name of advocacy group), nor will they know precisely who 
was mailed a survey. While there is no direct benefit to you for participating in the study, the 
anticipated benefit of the study is to enhance the understanding ofthe public policy activities by the 
nonprofit community. 
Participation in this research is voluntary. While it is unlikely, it is possible that some of the survey 
questions may make you feel uncomfortable. You are free to refuse to participate, decline to answer 
any question or withdraw at any point without penalties or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise 
entitled. While (name of organization) is aware of this study, they do not require you to participate. 
There will be no monetary costs to you, nor will you be reimbursed for participating in the study. I ask 
only for your time and effort. If you have questions, I can be reached at 415-336-7123 or 
khickey@usfca.edu. You're also welcome to contact the USF Institutional Review Board for the 
Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at 415-422-6091. 
Please complete and return the survey. Your response is important to me and to the field. 
Very Much Obliged, 
Kevin Hickey 
Graduate Student, Master's of Nonprofit Administration, University of San Francisco 
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